Counterfactuals and Explanation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
On the received view, counterfactuals are analysed using the concept of closeness between possible worlds: the counterfactual ‘If it had been the case that p, then it would have been the case that q’ is true at a world w just in case q is true at all the possible p-worlds closest to w. The degree of closeness between two worlds is usually thought to be determined by weighting different respects of similarity between them. The question I consider in the paper is which weights attach to different respects of similarity. I start by considering Lewis's answer to the question and argue against it by presenting several counterexamples. I use the same examples to motivate a general principle about closeness: if a fact obtains in both of two worlds, then this similarity is relevant to the closeness between them if and only if the fact has the same explanation in the two worlds. I use this principle and some ideas of Lewis's to formulate a general account of counterfactuals, and I argue that this account can explain the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. The paper concludes with a discussion of some examples that cannot be accommodated by the present version of the account and therefore necessitate further work on the details.
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Cites
Stalnaker, R. C. (1968) · IFS · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_2 · Cited by 2,220
Cited by
Mittelstadt, B., Russell, C., & Wachter, S. (2019) · Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3287560.3287574 · Cited by 794
“In recent decades, work in the philosophy of science and epis-temology has paid increasing attention to theories of contrastive explanations and counterfactual causality (e.g. Kment (2006); Lewis (1973); Ruben (2004); Woodward and Zalta (2003)).”
Modality and Explanatory Reasoning
Kment, B. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.001.0001 · Cited by 395
Self-citationStepin, I., Alonso, J. M., Catala, A., & Pereira-Farina, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3051315 · Cited by 376
“Similarly, Kment applies a similarity-based approach between possible worlds to formulate a general account of counterfactuals [39] driven by a non-epistemic interpretation of explanation (i.e., factors that serve as reasons for some fact to obtain are responsible for that fact).”
BackgroundBrogaard, B., & Salerno, J. (2013) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0196-6 · Cited by 288
Counterfactual Explanations and Algorithmic Recourses for Machine Learning: A Review
Verma, S., Boonsanong, V., Hoang, M., Hines, K. E., Dickerson, J. P., & Shah, C. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2010.10596 · Cited by 267
Metadata
- Authors
- Kment, B.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-04-01
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 458
- Pages
- 261-310
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2008425555
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 0.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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