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On Telling and Trusting
Abstract
A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to be truthful and demonstrate certain reactive attitudes if they are not. Trust and the accompanying willingness to these reactive attitudes can then provide speakers with a reason to be trustworthy. So through ignoring interlocutors' engagement with the communicative process, the existing debate misses the possibility that it is an audience's trusting a speaker that makes it reasonable for the audience to accept what the speaker says.
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Citations
Cited by
Trust, Distrust and Commitment
Hawley, K. (2014) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12000 · Cited by 535
Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal
Dormandy, K. (2024) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2020.49 · Cited by 42
Watson, L. (2016) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12316 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Faulkner, P.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-11-01
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 464
- Pages
- 875-902
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2079783432
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.