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Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal
Open accessAbstract
What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accounts – often the same ones – construe epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that it is not. We certainly do rely on our cognitive faculties to achieve epistemic ends; but I argue that we also have the normatively rich sort of epistemic trust in ourselves. Moreover, there is a theoretical need for this normatively rich notion of epistemic self-trust: positing it yields the best account of how we secure important epistemic goods, including knowledge and recognition as knowers. I argue this by giving an account of epistemic trust in others and showing that it can be generalized to epistemic trust in oneself.
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“as some philosophers have argued, self-trust in one's own capacities, together with the conscientious employment of these capacities, is an essential precondition for having justified beliefs and knowledge in the first place (Zagzebski, 2012 ; Dormandy, 2020 ).”
From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Dormandy, 2020
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Citations
Cites
Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
Zagzebski, L. T. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001 · Cited by 489
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Sorted by citations
Schmidt, E., Putora, P. M., & Fijten, R. (2025) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00834-9 · Cited by 14
“Another difference is that, as some philosophers have argued, self-trust in one’s own capacities, together with the conscientious employment of these capacities, is an essential precondition for having justified beliefs and knowledge in the first place (Zagzebski, 2012 ; Dormandy, 2020 ).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Dormandy, K.
- Affiliations
- Universität Innsbruck (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Dormandy, Katherine
- ORCID
- Dormandy, Katherine
- Venue
- Episteme
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2020-12-23
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 34-49
- ISSN
- 1742-3600 (ISSN-L)
- 1750-0117
- OpenAlex
- W3113914225
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 15 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 20.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Episteme (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Digital Library of the University of Innsbruck (University of Innsbruck) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic trust, normative attitudes, mental faculties, epistemic goods, knowledge, epistemic justification
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