What pain asymbolia really shows.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Pain asymbolics feel pain, but act as if they are indifferent to it. Nikola Grahek argues that such patients present a clear counterexample to motivationalism about pain. I argue that Grahek has mischaracterized pain asymbolia. Properly understood, asymbolics have lost a general capacity to care about their bodily integrity. Asymbolics’ indifference to pain thus does not show something about the intrinsic nature of pain; it shows something about the relationship between pains and subjects, and how that relationship might break down. I explore the consequences of such a view for both motivationalism and the categorization of pain asymbolia as a syndrome, arguing for a close link between asymbolia and various forms of depersonalization.
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In the citing paper
“pain asymbolia, aptly described by Klein (2015) as “depersonalization for pain.””
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein, 2015
In the citing paper
“pain asymbolia, aptly described by Klein (2015) as “depersonalization for pain.””
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein (2015)
In the citing paper
“In pain asymbolia, subjects report feeling detached from painful experience as though it is happening in their body but is not “theirs.””
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein (2015)
In the citing paper
“Thus, pain, aversive response, and negative affect are very tightly linked (Krahé et al., 2013; Klein, 2015; Gogolla, 2017; Von Mohr and Fotopoulou, 2018; Gehrlach et al., 2019).”
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein, 2015
In the citing paper
“Klein suggests that the pain sensation is unchanged, but what has changed in the experience is “the sort of agents we are,” i.e., the type of self we are.”
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein, 2015
Citations
Cites
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
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How do you feel? Interoception: The sense of the physiological condition of the body
Craig, A. D. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn894 · Cited by 6,006 · cited 2×
“One crucial function it plays seems to be in supporting what Craig (2002) calls interoception: that is, awareness and reflection on the state of one’s body.”
BackgroundDiagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ( DSM ‐ IV ‐ TR )
Segal, D. L. (2010) · The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470479216.corpsy0271 · Cited by 4,666
From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure
Shallice, T. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511526817 · Cited by 4,072
DISCONNEXION SYNDROMES IN ANIMALS AND MAN
GESCHWIND, N. (1965) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/88.2.237 · Cited by 3,403
Millan, M. J. (2002) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/s0301-0082(02)00009-6 · Cited by 3,035 · cited 1×
“These in turn receive modulatory input from higher levels of cortex (Millan 2002; Price 2005).”
BackgroundRaz, J. (1988) · doi:10.1093/0198248075.001.0001 · Cited by 2,895
Melzack, R., & Wall, P. D. (1996) · Pain Forum · doi:10.1016/s1082-3174(96)80062-6 · Cited by 2,784
Psychological and neural mechanisms of the affective dimension of pain
Price, D. D. (2000) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.288.5472.1769 · Cited by 2,092 · cited 1×
“Variants of this composite view of pain are popular among both philosophers and scientists (Dennett 1978; Hardcastle 1997; Price 2000).”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- 2005, Brain, 28, 2224
- 2002, 39, 13
- 2010, BRAIN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION, 214, 1
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Cited by
Bain, D. (2013) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0049-7 · Cited by 222
Minds without spines: Evolutionarily inclusive animal ethics
Mikhalevich, I., & Powell, R. (2020) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1527 · Cited by 175
“Moreover, the requirement that evidence of pain perception be ‘definitive’ is at odds with prevailing evidentiary standards for any proposition in the field of comparative cognition, let alone for policies that are intended to the experience of pain (Klein 2015).”
BackgroundCombining Minds: How to Think about Composite Subjectivity
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.001.0001 · Cited by 84
Unpleasantness, Motivational Oomph, and Painfulness
Corns, J. (2014) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12048 · Cited by 83
Bain, D. (2013) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2013.822399 · Cited by 82
Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, C.
- Affiliations
- Macquarie University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Klein, C.
- ORCID
- Klein, C.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2015-04-01
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 494
- Pages
- 493-516
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2043829418
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 20 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 10.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Medicine, History, and Philosophy
- Keywords
- bodily integrity, care, depersonalization, pain syndromes, philosophy of pain
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.