What pain asymbolia really shows.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Pain asymbolics feel pain, but act as if they are indifferent to it. Nikola Grahek argues that such patients present a clear counterexample to motivationalism about pain. I argue that Grahek has mischaracterized pain asymbolia. Properly understood, asymbolics have lost a general capacity to care about their bodily integrity. Asymbolics’ indifference to pain thus does not show something about the intrinsic nature of pain; it shows something about the relationship between pains and subjects, and how that relationship might break down. I explore the consequences of such a view for both motivationalism and the categorization of pain asymbolia as a syndrome, arguing for a close link between asymbolia and various forms of depersonalization.
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“pain asymbolia, aptly described by Klein (2015) as “depersonalization for pain.””
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein, 2015
In the citing paper
“pain asymbolia, aptly described by Klein (2015) as “depersonalization for pain.””
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein (2015)
In the citing paper
“In pain asymbolia, subjects report feeling detached from painful experience as though it is happening in their body but is not “theirs.””
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein (2015)
In the citing paper
“Thus, pain, aversive response, and negative affect are very tightly linked (Krahé et al., 2013; Klein, 2015; Gogolla, 2017; Von Mohr and Fotopoulou, 2018; Gehrlach et al., 2019).”
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein, 2015
In the citing paper
“Klein suggests that the pain sensation is unchanged, but what has changed in the experience is “the sort of agents we are,” i.e., the type of self we are.”
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Klein, 2015
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Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, C.
- Affiliations
- Macquarie University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Klein, C.
- ORCID
- Klein, C.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2015-04-01
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 494
- Pages
- 493-516
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2043829418
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 20 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 10.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Medicine, History, and Philosophy
- Keywords
- bodily integrity, care, depersonalization, pain syndromes, philosophy of pain
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.