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Doxastic incontinence.
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Doxastic Incontinence Get access JOHN HEIL JOHN HEIL DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, 3210 TOLMAN HALL, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIABERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720, U.S.A. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XCIII, Issue 369, January 1984, Pages 56–70, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCIII.369.56 Published: 01 January 1984
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“Note that (DA) shares almost all features with another phenomenon of practical irrationality, namely self-deception, except for the fact that both p and q may be true propositions, whereas according to the standard view, in self-deception, q will be false, and S knows or at least takes q to be false (Heil, 1984; Mele, 1987).”
From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Heil, 1984
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Metadata
- Authors
- HEIL, J.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- HEIL, JOHN
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- XCIII
- Issue
- 369
- Pages
- 56-70
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W4253977698
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 4 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 4.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- belief revision, epistemic justification, epistemology of belief
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