The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Doxastic incontinence.
Open accessAbstract
Doxastic Incontinence Get access JOHN HEIL JOHN HEIL DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, 3210 TOLMAN HALL, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIABERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720, U.S.A. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XCIII, Issue 369, January 1984, Pages 56–70, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCIII.369.56 Published: 01 January 1984
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“Note that (DA) shares almost all features with another phenomenon of practical irrationality, namely self-deception, except for the fact that both p and q may be true propositions, whereas according to the standard view, in self-deception, q will be false, and S knows or at least takes q to be false (Heil, 1984; Mele, 1987).”
From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Heil, 1984
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Items 101–107 of 107
McCormick, M. S. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198875826.002.0004
McCormick, M. S. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198875826.002.0006
Knowledge by Acquaintance and Impartial VirtuePreprint
Atiq, E. H. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5097431
Epistemic Responsibility in John Heil Viewpoint
Arabgoorchooee, F., Khazaei, Z., & Javadi, M. (2024) · Philosophical Thought · doi:10.58209/jpt.4.2.141
Nie, C. (2025) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2025.2503256
La duperie de soi et le problème de l'irrationalité
Correia, V. S. N. (2008) · doi:10.70675/1a483f67zce5bz46d0z8a02z8a847c7cd2cd
Randazzo, N. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05590-1
Metadata
- Authors
- HEIL, J.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- HEIL, JOHN
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- XCIII
- Issue
- 369
- Pages
- 56-70
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W4253977698
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 4 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 4.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- belief revision, epistemic justification, epistemology of belief
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