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An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn’t the content NCC
Open accessAbstract
Recent years have seen the rise of several theories saying that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a neural correlate of visual consciousness (NCC). Especially popular here are theories saying that the PFC is the ‘content NCC’ for vision, i.e. it contains those brain areas that are not only necessary for consciousness, but also determine ‘what’ it is that we visually experience (e.g. whether we experience green or red). This article points out how this “upper-deck” form of PFC theory is at odds with the character of visual experience: on the one hand, visual consciousness appears to contain copious amounts of content, with many properties (such as object, shape, or color) being simultaneously represented in many parts of the visual field. On the other hand, the functions that the PFC carries out (e.g. attention and working memory) are each dedicated to processing only a relatively small subset of available visual stimuli. In short, the PFC probably does not produce enough or the right kind of visual representations for it to supply all of the content found in visual experience, in which case the idea that the PFC is the content NCC for vision is probably false. This article also discusses data thought to undercut the idea that visual experience is informationally rich (inattentional blindness, etc.), along with theories of vision according to which “ensemble statistics” are used to represent features in the periphery of the visual field. I’ll argue that these lines of evidence fail to close the apparently vast gap between the amount of visual content represented in the visual experience and the amount represented in the PFC.
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“As a result, the failures to confirm this prediction challenge not only GNWT but also those higher-order theories54.”
From Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [54]
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References 163 · Cited by 9
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- Carruthers, 2020, Higher-order Theories of Consciousness
- Chuard, 2007, The riches of experience, J Conscious Stud, 14, 20
- Gennaro, 2012, The Consciousness Paradox
- Lau, 2019, Consciousness, metacognition, & perceptual reality monitoring, PsyArXiv Preprints
- Metcalfe, 2016, The Ghost in the Machine: Self-reflective Consciousness and the Neuroscience of Metacognition
- Minsky, 1988, Society of Mind
- Peacocke, 1983, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relation
Metadata
- Authors
- Kozuch, B.
- Affiliations
- University of Alabama (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kozuch, Benjamin
- ORCID
- Kozuch, Benjamin
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2024
- Volume
- 2024
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niae017-niae017
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC11210398
- OpenAlex
- W4400079139
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 163
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1
- FWCI
- 3.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- prefrontal cortex, neural correlates of consciousness, visual awareness, inattentional blindness, ensemble statistics, visual attention, working memory, visual representation, color experience
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