Severe Impairment in Grammar Does Not Preclude Theory of Mind
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Abstract
Debates about the role of language in human thinking are increasingly prominent in the cognitive sciences. There are claims that certain forms of reasoning can only be performed through access to the resources of the language faculty. In particular, a component of social cognition involving the representation of the mental states of others ('theory of mind' reasoning) has been claimed necessarily to involve propositions of natural language. A recent case study reported a man (SA) with severe agrammatic aphasia who was unable to understand or produce language propositions in any modality of language use, but who was able to complete theory of mind tasks. We report a replication of this finding using a modified picture theory of mind task with a second patient (MR). Despite severe aphasia and impaired performance on a test of executive function, MR demonstrated retained theory of mind reasoning. These results reveal the functional autonomy of theory of mind from the capacity for propositional/grammatical language, and support its independence from executive function.
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Cited by
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306
“Patients can be found who perform executive tasks very badly, while still performing mentalizing tasks well (Varley et al. 2001) and”
BackgroundMilligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x · Cited by 1,248
Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds
Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x08003543 · Cited by 1,174
“" Yet this patient continued to take care of the family finances and passed a battery of causal reasoning and ToM tests (see also Varley et al. 2001; 2005).”
The Neural Bases of Social Cognition and Story Comprehension
Mar, R. A. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145406 · Cited by 950
Evaluating the theory of executive dysfunction in autism
Hill, E. L. (2004) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2004.01.001 · Cited by 846
Metadata
- Authors
- Varley, R., Siegal, M., & Want, S. C.
- Venue
- Neurocase
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2001-01
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 489-493
- ISSN
- 1355-4794 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-3656
- OpenAlex
- W1982891645
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Varley, R., Siegal, M., & Want, S. C. (2001). Severe Impairment in Grammar Does Not Preclude Theory of Mind. Neurocase. https://doi.org/10.1093/neucas/7.6.489
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