Severe Impairment in Grammar Does Not Preclude Theory of Mind
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Abstract
Debates about the role of language in human thinking are increasingly prominent in the cognitive sciences. There are claims that certain forms of reasoning can only be performed through access to the resources of the language faculty. In particular, a component of social cognition involving the representation of the mental states of others ('theory of mind' reasoning) has been claimed necessarily to involve propositions of natural language. A recent case study reported a man (SA) with severe agrammatic aphasia who was unable to understand or produce language propositions in any modality of language use, but who was able to complete theory of mind tasks. We report a replication of this finding using a modified picture theory of mind task with a second patient (MR). Despite severe aphasia and impaired performance on a test of executive function, MR demonstrated retained theory of mind reasoning. These results reveal the functional autonomy of theory of mind from the capacity for propositional/grammatical language, and support its independence from executive function.
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Citations
Cited by
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306
“Patients can be found who perform executive tasks very badly, while still performing mentalizing tasks well (Varley et al. 2001) and”
BackgroundMilligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x · Cited by 1,248
Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds
Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x08003543 · Cited by 1,174
“" Yet this patient continued to take care of the family finances and passed a battery of causal reasoning and ToM tests (see also Varley et al. 2001; 2005).”
The Neural Bases of Social Cognition and Story Comprehension
Mar, R. A. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145406 · Cited by 950
Evaluating the theory of executive dysfunction in autism
Hill, E. L. (2004) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2004.01.001 · Cited by 846
The cognitive functions of language
Carruthers, P. (2002) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x02000122 · Cited by 728
Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging
Saxe, R., Carey, S., & Kanwisher, N. (2004) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142044 · Cited by 726
The interface of language and theory of mind
de Villiers, J. (2007) · Lingua · doi:10.1016/j.lingua.2006.11.006 · Cited by 457
“However, future work must reconcile these results with the two cases of apparently global aphasics who were able, after some training, to pass false belief tasks (Varley and Siegal, 2000; Varley et al., 2001 ).”
ResultNeural systems involved in 'theory of mind'
Siegal, M., & Varley, R. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn844 · Cited by 430
Self-citationBelief-desire reasoning as a process of selection
Leslie, A. M., German, T. P., & Polizzi, P. (2005) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2004.06.002 · Cited by 334
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C., & Humphreys, G. W. (2004) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/0898929042947928 · Cited by 321
“This is consistent with Varley, Siegal, and Want (2001), whose study of two severe aphasics suggested that severe impairment of language may not preclude the ability to reason about false beliefs.”
ResultThe language network as a natural kind within the broader landscape of the human brain
Fedorenko, E., Ivanova, A. A., & Regev, T. I. (2024) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-024-00802-4 · Cited by 293
Broca’s Area Is Not a Natural Kind
Fedorenko, E., & Blank, I. A. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.01.001 · Cited by 264
Fedorenko, E., & Varley, R. (2016) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.13046 · Cited by 247
Self-citationStudies of adults can inform accounts of theory of mind development.
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., & Humphreys, G. W. (2009) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0014098 · Cited by 238
“Apperly et al. (2006) examined a 3rd patient, PH, who, like the patients studied by Varley et al. (2001), has significant and disproportionate grammatical impairment following a left hemisphere lesion.”
BackgroundTheory of mind after traumatic brain injury
Bibby, H., & McDonald, S. (2005) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.04.027 · Cited by 230
“Similarly, while researchers such as Channon and Crawford (2000) found a relationship between executive functioning and ToM ability in adults with damage to the frontal lobes, others have failed to do so (Bach et al., 2000; Lough et al., 2001; Rowe et al., 2001; Varley et al., 2001).”
BackgroundHenry, J. D., Phillips, L. H., Crawford, J. R., Ietswaart, M., & Summers, F. (2006) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.03.020 · Cited by 213
Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought
Fedorenko, E., Piantadosi, S. T., & Gibson, E. A. F. (2024) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07522-w · Cited by 190
Thinking While Talking: Adults Fail Nonverbal False-Belief Reasoning
Newton, A. M., & de Villiers, J. G. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01942.x · Cited by 124
Intact first- and second-order false belief reasoning in a patient with severely impaired grammar
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., Carroll, N., Hussain, S., & Humphreys, G. (2006) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470910601038693 · Cited by 109
“To date just two such patients have been studied, revealing evidence of spared false belief reasoning abilities despite substantial general grammatical impairment (Varley & Siegal, 2000 ; Varley, Siegal, & Want, 2001 ).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialTheory of mind, language and the temporoparietal junction mystery
Perner, J., & Aichhorn, M. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.001 · Cited by 53
The language network is not engaged in object categorization
Benn, Y., Ivanova, A. A., Clark, O., Mineroff, Z., Seikus, C., Silva, J. S., Varley, R., & Fedorenko, E. (2023) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhad289 · Cited by 14
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Varley, R., Siegal, M., & Want, S. C.
- Venue
- Neurocase
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2001-01
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 489-493
- ISSN
- 1355-4794 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-3656
- OpenAlex
- W1982891645
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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