Experimental quantum secure network with digital signatures and encryption
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cryptography promises four information security objectives, namely, confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation, to support trillions of transactions annually in the digital economy. Efficient digital signatures, ensuring integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation of data with information-theoretical security are highly urgent and intractable open problems in cryptography. Here, we propose a high-efficiency quantum digital signature (QDS) protocol using asymmetric quantum keys acquired via secret sharing, one-time universal2 hashing and a one-time pad. We just need to use a 384-bit key to sign documents of lengths up to 264 with a security bound of 10−19. If a one-megabit document is signed, the signature efficiency is improved by more than 108 times compared with previous QDS protocols. Furthermore, we build the first all-in-one quantum secure network integrating information-theoretically secure communication, digital signatures, secret sharing and conference key agreement and experimentally demonstrate this signature efficiency advantage. Our work completes the cryptography toolbox of the four information security objectives.
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Citations
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Hierarchical controlled hybrid quantum communication based on six-qubit entangled states in IoT
Hua, X., Li, D., Fu, Y., Zhu, Y., Jiang, Y., Zhou, J., Yang, X., & Tan, Y. (2023) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s23229111 · Cited by 15
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Yin, H.-L., Fu, Y., Li, C.-L., Weng, C.-X., Li, B.-H., Gu, J., Lu, Y.-S., Huang, S., & Chen, Z.-B.
- Venue
- National Science Review
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2022-10-22
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- nwac228-nwac228
- ISSN
- 2053-714X (ISSN-L)
- 2095-5138
- OpenAlex
- W3183336522
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 14.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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