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Cited by 1,349Global Financial Regulation and CrisesRegulation and Compliance StudiesEuropean Union Policy and Governance

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The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World

Open access
Bradford, Anu·2020
DOI 10.1093/oso/9780190088583.001.0001
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Abstract

The Brussels Effect challenges the prevalent view that the European Union (EU) is a declining world power. It argues that notwithstanding its many obvious challenges, the EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image through a phenomenon called the “Brussels Effect.” The Brussels Effect refers to the EU’s unilateral power to regulate global markets. Without the need to resort to international institutions or seek other nations’ cooperation, the EU has the unique ability among nations today to promulgate regulations that shape the global business environment, elevating standards worldwide and leading to a notable Europeanization of many important aspects of global commerce. Different from many other forms of global influence, the Brussels Effect entails that the EU does not need to impose its standards coercively on anyone—market forces alone are often sufficient to convert the EU standard into the global standard as multinational companies voluntarily extend the EU rule to govern their global operations. In this way, the EU wields significant, unique, and highly penetrating power to unilaterally transform global markets, including through its ability to set the standards in diverse areas such as competition regulation, data protection, online hate speech, consumer health and safety, or environmental protection.

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  1. [4]4. Kevin J. O'Brien, Anger in Europe over Google and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2010, at B5 (discussing personal information Google collected through Street View, and Google's response); Scheer, supra note 3 (discussing GM, DuPont, and Procter & Gamble's practice of applying EU-like standards to its employee data worldwide); see also Mark Berniker, EU: Microsoft Agrees to .NET Passport Changes, DATAMATION (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.datamation.com/entdev/article.php/1576901/EU-Microsoft-Agrees-to-NET-Passport- Changes.htm (discussing Microsoft's agreement with EU authorities to implement a data protection plan regarding one of its products). 165 See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,988, 22,991 (May 29, 1992). 166 Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1, 2. 167 See Joanne Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 219- 24 (2003). 168 Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labelling of Genetically Modified Organisms, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24, 26-27. 169 But see Aseem Prakash & Kelly L. Kollman, Biopolitics in the EU and the U.S.: A Race to the Bottom or Convergence to the Top?, 47 INT'L STUD. Q. 617, 629-34 (2003) (discussing how U.S. and EU regulatory approaches may be converging as state-level legislative activity and court challenges against GMOs grow). 170 Id. at 627. 171 Id. Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, supra note 185, at 1070-72. 269 Appellate Body Report, supra note 268, at 28. 270 See id. at 20-23. 271 Id. at 7. 272 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Challenging EU Restrictions on U.S. Poultry Exports (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press- office/press-releases/2009/january/us-files-wto-case-challenging-eu-restrictions-us-p. 273
  2. [6]6. U.S.C.). Given the current state of flux of European financial regulation, it is not clear how the United States and the EU will compare in terms of the relative stringency of their banking and other financial regulations. 294 See, e.g., Bob Sherwood, Long Arm of the US Regulator, FT.COM (Mar. 9, 2005, 6:37 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/be157b6a-90c6-11d9-9980-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2CJweoF8T; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002) (discussing the impact of stock exchange "cross-listing" on global regulatory competition in the securities arena). A related question is whether the availability of securities class actions in the United States deters foreign companies from listing on a U.S. exchange. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 11 (2006) ("Foreign companies commonly cite the U.S. class action enforcement system as the most important reason why they do not want to list in the U.S. market."). 295 See Joshua Chaffin et al., Business Lashes Out at Trading Tax Plans, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 29, 2011, at 1. The tax would apply as long as "one party to the transaction were established in a Member State of the EU and that a financial institution established in the territory of the Member State concerned was party to the transaction." Press Release, European Comm'n, Common Rules for a Financial Transaction Tax-Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 28, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/ rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/640.
  3. [7]7. other conditions for the Brussels Effect are also missing: the EU currently lacks the regulatory competence (or capacity) to impose this tax; the required regulatory propensity is also missing, as the U.K. opposes the proposal. There are also alternative markets for trading activity, reducing the EU's leverage. Finally, the tax is also divisible in the sense that all jurisdictions do not have to apply the same tax, but instead retain their autonomy to regulate trade in their jurisdictions. 297 Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV., EUR-Lex 62010CJ0034 (Oct. 18, 2011). 298 See Scientists Fear Stem Cell Ruling Deals Blow to EU Research, EURACTIV.COM (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.euractiv.com/health/scientists-fear-stem-cell-ruling-deals-blow-eu-research-news- 508404. 299 See supra Part I.E. 300 See Emil Protalinski, Windows 7 to Be Shipped in Europe Without Internet Explorer, ARSTECHNICA (June 11, 2009, 2:57 PM), http://arstechnica.com/microsoft/news/2009/06/windows-7-to- be-shipped-in-europe-sans-internet-explorer.ars. 301 See, e.g., KPMG INT'L, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION EFFECT 16 (2010), available at http://www.kpmg.de/docs/ transformation-automotive-industry.pdf (discussing technology-implementation strategies used by auto companies in complying with divergent national regulations).

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Metadata

Authors
Bradford, A.
Affiliations
Columbia University (US)
Corresponding author
Bradford, Anu
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
Published
2019-12-19
Volume
107
Issue
1
Pages
25-66
DOI
10.1093/oso/9780190088583.001.0001
OpenAlex
W3124473989
Cited by
1,349
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 371 · 2025: 344 · 2024: 188 · 2023: 141 · 2022: 100 · 2021: 77 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 13
FWCI
59.61
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
  • eYLS (Yale Law School) (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • Northwestern University law review
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Regulation and Crises
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European Union Policy and Governance
Keywords
Brussels effect, regulatory capacity, market size, consumer market, capital markets, regulatory standards

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