Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
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Abstract
Is there a limit to the legitimate demands of morality? In particular, is there a limit to people’s responsibility to promote the well-being of others, either directly or via social institutions? Utilitarianism admits no such limit, and is for that reason often said to be an unacceptably demanding moral and political view. In this original new study, Murphy argues that the charge of excessive demands amounts to little more than an affirmation of the status quo. The real problem with utilitarianism is that it makes unfair demands on people who comply with it in our world of non-ideal compliance. Murphy shows that this unfairness does not arise on a collective understanding of our responsibility for others’ well being. Thus, according to Murphy, while there is no general problem to be raised about the extent of moral demands, there is a pressing need to acknowledge the collective nature of the demands of beneficence.
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Cited by
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Ideal vs. Non‐ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map
Valentini, L. (2012) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00500.x · Cited by 1,091
Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation
Farrelly, C. (2007) · Political Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00656.x · Cited by 622
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL HEALTH: A RESEARCH PROGRAM
Pogge, T. W. (2005) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00362.x · Cited by 495
One World, Many Peoples: International Justice in John Rawls's The Law of Peoples
Doyle, M. W. (2006) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592706060117 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Murphy, L. B.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York, NY
- Published
- 2000-08-31
- OpenAlex
- W4388154674
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 5.03
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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