Cited by 176Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEconomic Theory and Institutions

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 62 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Social Norms and Social Roles

Open access
Sunstein, Cass R·1997·Free Markets and Social Justice

Abstract

Economists have invented a game: the ultimatum game. The people who run the game give some money, on a provisional basis, to two players. The first player is instructed to offer some part of the money to the second player. If the second player accepts that amount, he can keep what is offered, and the first player gets to keep the rest. But if the second player rejects the offer, neither player gets anything. No bargaining is allowed. Both players are informed that these are the rules. Using standard assumptions about rationality, self-interest, and choice, economists predict that the first player should offer a penny and the second player should accept.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Sunstein argues that behavior is pervasively shaped by social norms, social roles, and social meanings, so the standard notion of “preferences” is ambiguous and often misleading for law and social science. He defends government “norm management” as an inevitable and potentially valuable tool for improving well-being and autonomy, subject to rights-based limits.

Key findings

  • In ultimatum games, standard self-interest predicts a penny offer accepted, but offers usually average 30–40% of the total, offers below 20% are often rejected, and 50–50 splits are common; these results cut across stakes and cultures. In Cialdini’s littering experiment, almost none in the treatment group threw flyers on the street after seeing someone pick up trash, versus over 1/3 in the control group.
  • Smoking causes about 400,000 U.S. deaths yearly and about one million Americans begin smoking yearly; in 1993, 22.9% of white teenagers smoked versus only about 4.4% of African-American teenagers, a figure four times lower than a decade before. Among African-Americans aged 18–24, smoking fell from 37.1% (1965) to 10.3% (1992), while white rates fell from 38.4% (1965) to 27.8% (1987) and then stayed roughly constant. The preventable-risk table lists tobacco at 19%/~400,000 deaths per year, diet/activity at 14%/~300,000, and alcohol at 5%/~100,000.
  • Willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparities are large: people demanded about five times as much to allow destruction of park trees as they would pay to prevent it; hunters would pay $247 to prevent loss of a license but demand $1,044 to accept it; a houseplant study found mean WTP $7.81 versus mean WTA $18.43. WTA usually doubles WTP, environmental goods show factors of two to over ten, and some tree experiments average around 75/1; Sunstein attributes part of this to shame and social norms.
  • Norms operate as taxes or subsidies on choice; norm entrepreneurs can trigger norm bandwagons and cascades; law has an expressive function and can change norms, meanings, and roles. The article argues that individual agents have little control over norms and face collective action problems, so collective/legal action may be needed, though rights should constrain norm management.

Methods

  • Conceptual/theoretical legal article, not an original empirical study. It synthesizes experimental economics, social psychology, and legal examples, including secondary data and published experiments.
  • Uses five opening “tales” (ultimatum game, littering, smoking/race, Hamptons recycling, John Jones) to illustrate anomalies and the role of norms, roles, meanings, shame, and pride.
  • Analytical framework distinguishes social norms, social roles, and social meanings; critiques “preferences” as ambiguous between choices and underlying mental states; proposes intrinsic value, reputational effects, and self-conception as more concrete categories; discusses government tools from information and persuasion to incentives and coercion.

Limitations

  • Stated: empirical questions remain about whether and under what conditions law actually affects social norms and meanings; much work remains. The paper also warns that reference to norms can become a conclusory explanation and that norm management may be futile or counterproductive (e.g., “just say no”).
  • Stated: the WTP/WTA explanation is offered as one possibility among many, not exhaustive; the African-American teenage smoking decline is described as a public health success story that government officials cannot fully explain.
  • Evident from the text: the article relies on illustrative examples and secondary literature rather than systematic original testing, and its normative proposals are programmatic; it does not provide a full account of rights limits or an empirical test of law’s norm-changing effects.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/oso/9780195102727.003.0003

Cites

17 of 17 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

360 Own interpretation · 56 Sources not found · 13 No basis given

Show all 145 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 87
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 253
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
284 of 284
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    For present purposes, differences among possible definitions of social norms are not important, and conventional understandings are adequate.

    “For present purposes the differences among the possible definitions are not very important, and we can rely on conventional understandings.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    People may not have much allegiance to social norms.

    “people may not have much allegiance.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    People's private judgments and desires diverge greatly from public appearances.

    “People's private judgments and desires diverge greatly from public appearances.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Government cannot avoid affecting social norms.

    “which cannot avoid affecting social norms.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The social meaning of condom use is a confession, an accusation, or a statement that one is not spontaneous.

    “Suppose that the social meaning of condom use is a confession, an accusation, 94 or a statement,”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The social meaning of a male teenager's refusal to fight when insulted is that he is cowardly.

    “Suppose that the social meaning of a male teenager's refusal to fight when insulted is,”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Under apartheid in South Africa, public criticism of apartheid much understated private opposition to apartheid.

    “Under the apartheid regime in South Africa, public criticism of apartheid-at least within South Africa-much understated private opposition to apartheid.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    People usually do not want to feel shame.

    “People usually do not want to feel shame”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    People usually do not choose norms, meanings, and roles; all of these are (within limits) imposed.

    “Recall that people usually do not choose norms, meanings, and roles; all of these are (within limits) imposed.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Norms, meanings, and roles make life possible and much facilitate social engagement.

    “They make life possible and they much facilitate social engagement.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The relation between behavior and norms has yet to receive sustained attention.

    “The relation between behavior and norms has yet to receive sustained attention”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Changes in norms may be the cheapest and most effective way to make things better.

    “In fact changes in norms may be the cheapest and most effective way to make things better, whatever are our criteria for assessing that matter.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There is a general norm in favor of obeying the law.

    “norm in favor of obeying the law.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    People have to be brought up to have a sense of shame, and to have a certain understanding of what sorts of things call for shame.

    “Of course people have to be brought up to have a sense of shame, and to have a certain understanding of what sorts of things call for shame”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Many women believe on reflection that the social meaning of being a woman is bad for them and that it should be changed.

    “But many women believe on reflection that the social meaning of being a woman is bad for them and that it should be changed.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A caste system tends to deny autonomy to lower caste members.

    “In any case a caste system tends to deny autonomy to lower caste members.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The social role of “being a woman” is associated with a wide range of social norms and social meanings.

    “The social role of “being a woman” is associated with a wide range of social norms and social meanings.”
17 of 17

Citations

Cites

Show all 15 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. A good overview is Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 59 (1993). See also W.R. Dubourg et al., Imprecise Preferences and the WTP-WTA Disparity, 9J. Risk & Uncertainty 115, 116 (1994) (arguing that imprecision of people's preferences is a factor explaining WTP-WTA disparities). 142. It was first so-called in Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 39 (1980). This essay, along with others of similar interest, can be found in Quasi Rational Economics, supra note 38. 143. See David S. Brookshire & Don L. Coursey, Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation Procedures, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 554, 562-63 (1987). 144. SeeJudd Hammack & Gardner M. Brown,Jr., Waterfowl and Wetlands: Towards Bioeconomic Analysis 26-27 (1974). 145. See Robert D. Rowe et al., An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visibility, 7 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 1, 10 (1980). 146. See Rebecca R. Boyce et al., An Experimental Examination of Intrinsic Values as a Source of the WTA-WTP Disparity, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 1366, 1370 (1992). [Vol. 96:903 HeinOnline --96 Colum. L. Rev. 942 1996 reactions to changes in risks). 175. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in Quasi Rational Economics, supra note 88, at 167, 182-86. 176. See Beth E. Meyerowitz & Shelly Chaiken, The Effect of Message Framing on Breast Self-Examination Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior, 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 500, 506-09 (1987). 177. See Marti H. Gonzales et al., Using Social Cognition and Persuasion to Promote Energy Conservation: A Quasi-Experiment, 18J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1049, 1062 (1988). 178. See Viscusi, supra note 65, at 149-59. 179. See supra Part I.C. 180. See U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 8, at 144. 181. See id. 182. Donald Bradley, Few Black Teens Smoke, But Why?, Kan. City Star, Aug. 12, 1995, atAl (quoting Michael Eriksen, Director of the Office on Smoking and Health at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 191. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1735-36 (1995);
  2. Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity 1-5 (1987) (discussing moral examples). Creativity in politics and law usually consists of assimilating new cases to the paradigm ones. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 191, at ch. 3. 208. Some cases can be imagined in which the response would be invasive of rights and therefore, by hypothesis, unacceptable. See infra Part VII. 209. See supra Part I.E. 210. See Sen, supra note 78, at 26-31, 34. 211. Of course there are other reasons, including the free-rider problem, since citizens may support laws for whose costs other people are responsible. 1996] HeinOnline --96 Colum. L. Rev. 959 1996 [Vol. 96:903 HeinOnline --96 Colum. L. Rev. 964 1996

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Metadata

Authors
Sunstein, C. R.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Sunstein, Cass R
Venue
Free Markets and Social Justice
Published
1997-02-06
Pages
32-69
OpenAlex
W1848653928
Cited by
175
References
15
Citations by year
2024: 4 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 8
FWCI
17.85
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Licence
public-domain
Locations
  • bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion, public-domain)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
ultimatum game, social norms, social roles, fairness, rationality assumption, self-interest, bargaining, experimental economics

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