The DOI matches its Crossref record; 90 of the 96 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust and crowding
Abstract
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. “More law,” it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. We examine a contractual relationship in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability affects individual performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preference adaptation and find that economic incentives have a nonmonotonic effect on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement is strong or weak but not with medium enforcement probabilities: Trustworthiness is “crowded in” with weak and “crowded out” with medium enforcement. In a laboratory experiment we test our model’s implications and find support for the crowding prediction. Our finding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trust in formerly Communist countries.
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“However, social norms (such as generalized reciprocity) also differ across groups, they have to evolve over time, and triggering them may depend on the trustor's signaling of group membership (Bohnet et al., 2001; Fukuyama, 1999).”
From The mechanics of trust: A framework for research and design (2005) · cites this paper as Bohnet et al., 2001
In the citing paper
“It is also worth emphasizing that similar results were obtained in the studies of Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001), Benz, Fehr and Frey (2001), Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001) and Schulze and Frank (2001).”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001)
Citations
Cites
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Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555475 · Cited by 7,484 · cited 1×
“1 See, for example, Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; or Putnam 1993.”
BackgroundDeci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176 · cited 1×
“For experimental evidence, see the extensive survey of psychology studies by Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999 as well as Falk, Gächter, and Kovacs 1999.”
BackgroundCulture and the Evolutionary Process
Griesemer, J. R., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1986) · The Condor · doi:10.2307/1367778 · Cited by 7,034
Evolution and the Theory of Games
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Cited by
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify Behavior
Gneezy, U., Meier, S., & Rey-Biel, P. (2011) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.4.191 · Cited by 1,735
Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.898 · Cited by 1,475
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
Chaudhuri, A. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 · Cited by 1,445
“…(Andreoni et al. 1998; Frey and Torgler 2007), managing natural resources (Cardenas et al. 2002; Carpenter and Seki 2009; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994), labor relations (Bewley 1999, 2005), legal enforcement (Bohnet et al. 2001; Kahan 2005) and many others, possibly unexplored as of yet.”
BackgroundPsychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240
Metadata
- Authors
- Bohnet, I., Frey, B. S., & Huck, S.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2001-03
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 131-144
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W3123960376
- Cited by
- 391
- References
- 96
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 25
- FWCI
- 68.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- contract enforcement, trust, crowding in, crowding out, incomplete contracts, contract performance, preference adaptation, economic incentives, post-communist transition
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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