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From phantom limb to phantom body. Varieties of extracorporeal awareness
Abstract
Corporeal awareness refers to the experience of having a body. While this may appear self-evident given our constant daily experience of embodiment, the neuronal processes mediating this experience are nonetheless highly manifold and complex. Corporeal awareness relies on perceptual functions (e.g., tactile, proprioceptive, gravitational, visual) and on motor programs for bodily action. Yet, it also comprises a sense of the self as the object of sensory stimulation and as the agent of motor intentions and executions. Moreover, identifying with a body implies knowledge of its borders. Thus, the study of corporeal awareness includes investigations of the many functionally organized spaces for each distinct sensory and motor representation that surrounds our body. In the past, various terms have been used to capture some of the heterogeneous functions that guarantee a continuous sense of embodiment. Some of the more frequently used terms are body schema, body image, body self, somesthesis, coaenesthesia, and somatognosia. Critchley (1955/1979) complained about the fact that these terms were employed more or less interchangeably despite the fact that they had originally been introduced to designate specific facets of bodily perception and representation. He therefore proposed the deliberately less definitive term corporeal awareness as an all-encompassing descriptor of the experience of having a body.
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“MPS is associated with global, fully embodied self-consciousness and is experienced as a single feature, namely a coherent representation of the whole, spatially situated bodyand not as multiple representations of separate body parts (i.e.finger [33,36], hand [12] or hemibody [37]).”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [37]
In the citing paper
“MPS breaks down in neurological patients with illusory global own body perceptions, called autoscopic phenomena [23,27,37,47-49], that are characterized by seeing a second own body in extracorporeal space: autoscopic hallucination, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experience (Figure 1) (Box 2).”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [37]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Brugger, P.
- Corresponding author
- Brugger, Peter
- ORCID
- Brugger, Peter
- Venue
- Human Body Perception From The Inside Out
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York, NY
- Published
- 2005-12-04
- Pages
- 171-210
- OpenAlex
- W4388322930
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 4.96
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- embodiment, phantom limb, body schema, body image, body self, proprioception, tactile perception, body boundaries, self-awareness
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