Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood

May combine two claims.

Because the conscious body model is phenomenally transparent, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves.

“Because this conscious body model is phenomenally transparent because it cannot introspectively be recognized as a model, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves (self-identification) [6,7,23,24].”

• cites [6] Metzinger, 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [7] Metzinger, 2003, Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference, Phenom. Cogn. Sci. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourcePartly supported

  Theoretical considerations (page unavailable) describes a central representation of one’s body, and Discussion Phenomenology (page unavailable) reports preserved self-recognition during autoscopic experiences. The paper does not say that the body model is phenomenally transparent or that inability to recognize it introspectively causes full identification with its content. (LLM, conf=0.83)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [24] Metzinger, 2005, Out-of-body experiences as the origin of the concept of a “soul”, Mind and MatterNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

The bodily self or MPS is altered and abnormal during out-of-body experiences and heautoscopy, and experimentally manipulated during the full-body illusion.

“It is this bodily self or MPS which is altered and abnormal during out-of-body experiences [23-25], heautoscopy (see Box 2) [15,26,27] and experimentally manipulated during the full-body illusion [13,28].”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceSupported
• cites [24] Metzinger, 2005, Out-of-body experiences as the origin of the concept of a “soul”, Mind and MatterNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [25] Blanke, 2002, Stimulating illusory own-body perceptions, Nature sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [15] Brugger, 2002, Reflective mirrors: perspective-taking in autoscopic phenomena, Cogn. Neuropsychiatry sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [26] Blanke, 2007, Clinical neuroimaging in epileptic patients with autoscopic hallucinations and out-of-body experiences. Case report and review of the literature, EpileptologieNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [27] Blanke, 2005, Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness, Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. sourceSupported
• cites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [28] Ehrsson, 2007, The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Out-of-body experiences are highly realistic, and most often there is no insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon.

“Out-of-body experiences are highly realistic, and most often there is no insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon [23].”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

In heautoscopy, self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented, or to both in alternation.

“Self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to both in alternation [23,27,49] (Box 2).”

• Also stated in: § Heautoscopy · plain

  “Self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to both, in alternation or simultaneously.”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourcePartly supported

  The Discussion (Phenomenology) and Fig. 5 (Theoretical considerations; page not provided) describe heautoscopy as involving visual perspectives from the physical and illusory bodies, sometimes in alternation. They do not establish the more specific claim that self-identification shifts between those bodies; visual perspective and self-identification are not the same finding. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [27] Blanke, 2005, Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness, Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. sourceSupported
• cites [49] Brugger, 1997, Illusory reduplication of one's own body: phenomenology and classification of autoscopic phenomena, Cogn. Neuropsychiatry sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Autoscopic phenomena are associated with multisensory disintegration and can be caused by focal brain damage.

“Autoscopic phenomena are associated with multisensory disintegration and can be caused by focal brain damage (Figure 2) [26,27].”

• cites [26] Blanke, 2007, Clinical neuroimaging in epileptic patients with autoscopic hallucinations and out-of-body experiences. Case report and review of the literature, EpileptologieNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [27] Blanke, 2005, Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness, Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Out-of-body experiences are associated with a sense of disembodiment and people always self-identify with the illusory body as represented.

“Out-of-body experiences are associated with a sense of disembodiment and people always self-identify with the illusory body as represented.”

• Also stated in: § Out-of-body experience · plain

  “Self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are never at the position of the physical body as represented, and out-of-body experiences are associated with a sense of disembodiment (the experience that the subject of conscious experience is localized outside the person's bodily borders) [23].”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourcePartly supported

  The Theoretical considerations section links OBEs with disembodiment, and Visual phenomenology reports that all three OBE patients localized their perspective in a second, parasomatic body. This supports the self-location aspect, but the paper does not establish that people always self-identify with an illusory body across OBEs generally; its observation is limited to the patients studied. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Autoscopic hallucinations are preferentially caused by damage to right parieto-occipital or right temporo-occipital cortex, whereas heautoscopy and out-of-body experience are caused by damage to temporoparietal cortex of the left and right hemisphere, respectively.

“Recent neuroanatomical analysis indicated that autoscopic hallucinations are preferentially caused by damage to right parieto-occipital or right temporo-occipital cortex, whereas heautoscopy and out-of-body experience are caused by damage to temporoparietal cortex of the left and right hemisphere, respectively [27,47].”

• cites [27] Blanke, 2005, Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness, Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. sourcePartly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [47] Blanke, 2008, Illusory reduplications of the human body and self, Handbook of Clinical Neurology sourcePartly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The vestibular system is important for global body representation and MPS because it encodes translation and rotation of the body in addition to orientation with respect to gravity.

“Another sensory system important for global body representation and MPS is the vestibular system because it encodes translation and rotation of the body in addition to orientation with respect to gravity [45,46].”

• cites [45] Lopez, 2008, Body ownership and embodiment: vestibular and multisensory mechanisms, Neurophysiol. Clin. sourcePartly supported

  The section on the multisensory vestibular cortex links vestibular cues to body movement, body position in space, and an accurate representation of body location. The section on microgravity also describes illusory rotation, translation, and verticality. These passages support the body-representation rationale, but our copy does not establish the claimed importance of the vestibular system for MPS specifically. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [46] Lopez, 2007, Neuropsychology and Neurophysiology of Self-Consciousness. Multisensory and vestibular mechanismsNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

In heautoscopy, self-location and weak first-person perspective might change their experienced position between the illusory and physical body and can occur in rapid alternation.

“Moreover, self-location and weak 1PP might change their experienced position (between the position of the illusory and the physical body as represented) and this can occur in rapid alternation.”

• Also stated in: § Heautoscopy · plain

  “Both MPS dimensions can change their experienced position (between the position of the illusory and the physical body as represented) and this can occur in rapid alternation [23].”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourcePartly supported

  The Discussion Phenomenology section reports rapid alternation between parasomatic and physical visuo-spatial perspectives in heautoscopy, supporting the first-person-perspective part of the claim. It also says these patients did not feel out of their bodies, so the paper does not establish that their experienced self-location alternated between the two bodies. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Heautoscopy is highly realistic and the person most often has no insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon.

“Heautoscopy is highly realistic and the person has most often no insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon.”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Heautoscopy is often associated with the sensation of 'being split in two selves'.

“Heautoscopy is often associated with the sensation of 'being split in two selves' [23].”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Self-identification in autoscopic phenomena either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to both.

“Self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to both.”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The experience of being the author of one's actions and to be able to selectively control a body at will with the help of explicit goal-representations is a central enabling condition for the development of MPS.

“The experience of being the author of one's actions and to be able to selectively control a body at will with the help of explicit goal-repres-entations certainly is a central enabling condition for the development of MPS [11].”

• cites [11] Pacherie, 2008, The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework, Cognition sourcePartly supported

  Section 6, “Sense of agency,” defines agency as the sense of being the author of an action; Sections 2.3 and 3 describe how goals and intentions guide action selection and control. The paper does not say that these experiences are a central enabling condition for the development of MPS. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The patient has the impression to see the environment from the physical body as represented in the case of autoscopic hallucination, from the illusory body as represented in the case of out-of-body experience and alternatively or simultaneously from the physical and the illusory body as represented in the case of heautoscopy.

“The patient has the impression to see the environment from the physical body as represented in the case of autoscopic hallucination, from the illusory body as represented in the case of out-of-body experience and alternatively or simultaneously from the physical and the illusory body as represented in the case of heautoscopy (after [23]).”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Autoscopic phenomena indicate that conscious experience can also be characterized by the absence of a unitary visual weak 1PP, or by two simultaneous or rapidly alternating visual weak 1PPs.

“autoscopic phenomena indicate that conscious experience can also be characterized by the absence of a unitary visual weak 1PP, or by two simultaneous or rapidly alternating visual weak 1PPs.”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceSupported
• cites [50] Brugger, 1994, Heautoscopy, epilepsy, and suicide, J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry sourceSupported

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Under normal conditions humans experience a single visual weak 1PP.

May combine two claims.

Heautoscopy is an intermediate form and self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are either at the position of the physical body as represented or at the position of the illusory body as represented or at both positions.

“Heautoscopy is an intermediate form and self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are either at the position of the physical body as represented or at the position of the illusory body as represented or at both positions.”

• cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Brain imaging studies associated the rubber-hand illusion with bilateral activations in several brain regions, but this is only partly compatible with data on somatoparaphrenia highlighting temporo-parietal cortex and the right hemisphere.

“Brain imaging studies associated the RHI with bilateral activations in several brain regions [34,35], yet this is only partly compatible with data on somatoparaphrenia that highlight the importance of temporo-parietal cortex and the right hemisphere.”

• cites [34] Ehrsson, 2004, That's my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of ownership of a limb, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [35] Tsakiris, 2007, Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness, Cereb. Cortex sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

In out-of-body experiences, the strong first-person perspective is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification.

“The strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent selfidentification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55,63]).”

• cites [55] Mizumoto, 2005, Immunity to error through misidentification and the bodily illusion experiment, J. Conscious. Stud.Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites [63] Shoemaker, 1968, Self-reference and self-awareness, J. Philos. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Heautoscopy is sometimes associated with 'bi-location', the experience that self-location and the origin of the weak first-person perspective are simultaneously at different positions.

“Heautoscopy is sometimes associated with 'bi-location' (the experience that self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are simultaneously at different positions).”

May combine two claims.

Somatoparaphrenia affects only the contralesional (mostly left) hand or foot, and never ipsilesional body parts.

“Somatoparaphrenia affects only the contralesional (mostly left) hand (or foot), and never ipsilesional body parts.”

May combine two claims.

In heautoscopy, all three dimensions of MPS are pathological, as is the strong first-person perspective.

“All three dimensions of the MPS are pathological as is the strong 1PP.”

May combine two claims.

In out-of-body experiences, weak first-person perspective, self-location and self-identification with an illusory body at an extracorporeal position are complete: self-location and weak first-person perspective are localized outside one's bodily borders and people have the experience of seeing their body from this disembodied location.

“In out-of-body experiences the weak 1PP, self-location and self-identification with an illusory body as represented at an extracorporeal position are complete: self-location and weak 1PP are localized outside one's bodily borders and people have the experience of seeing their body from this disembodied location (Figure 1).”

May combine two claims.

In autoscopic hallucinations, the person sees an illusory own body in front but has preserved insight into its illusory character.

“The person sees an illusory own body in front of him, but has preserved insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon.”

May combine two claims.

The hemisphere of predominant involvement is right for autoscopic hallucination, left for heautoscopy, and right for out-of-body experience.

“we indicated in the figure the hemisphere of predominant involvement in autoscopic hallucination (right), heautoscopy (left) and out-of-body experience (right).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

MPS or any self-representation are not static internal copies but ongoing processes of tracking and controlling global bodily properties.

“MPS or any selfrepresentation are not static internal copies of some mysterious thing or individual substance ('the' self), but only ongoing processes of tracking and controlling global bodily propertiesfor example with the help of an explicit, integrated body-model.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A strong first-person perspective is what makes consciousness subjective: the system represents itself not only as a self but also as a self in the act of knowing.

“A strong 1PP is exactly what makes consciousness subjective: the fact that a system represents itself not only as a self but also as 'a self in the act of knowing' [20] (Box 1).”

• cites [20] Damasio, 1999Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Spatiotemporal self-location, self-identification and weak first-person perspective are necessary and sufficient for MPS.

“We claim that spatiotemporal self-location, self-identification and weak 1PP are necessary and sufficient for MPS.”

• Also stated in: § Sufficient conditions that are not necessary · plain

  “Weak 1PP, self location and self identification are jointly sufficient for MPS.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A conscious body model defines a volume within a spatial frame of reference within which the origin of the weak first-person perspective is localized.

“A conscious body model defines a volume within a spatial frame of reference (the dimension of 'self-location') within which the origin of the weak 1PP is localized (for temporal aspects of self-location see Refs [6,18]).”

• cites [6] Metzinger, 2003Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites [18] Arzy, 2006, Neural basis of embodiment: distinct contributions of temporoparietal junction and extrastriate body area, J. Neurosci. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The representational content of MPS indicates to the system that an integrated functional state has been reached, which makes the body available for attention and global control.

“The essence of selfhood, the representational content of MPS, is that it indicates to the system that a specific state in its internal neural dynamics has been reached, namely an integrated functional state, which for the first time makes the body available for attention and global control.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

In philosophy of mind, there is widespread agreement that the core problem consists of understanding the pre-reflective bodily foundations of phenomenal selfhood.

“In philosophy of mind, there is widespread agreement that the core of the problem consists of understanding the pre-reflective bodily foundations of phenomenal selfhood (defined here as all those levels which are independent of explicit cognition and linguistic abilities, and which give rise to the subjective experience of being a self), but which can function as enabling conditions for a concept”

• cites [3][4][5][6][7][8]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Researchers have investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but have neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour.

“Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The existence of a conscious, transparent and global body-representation available for attentional access is a sufficient condition for MPS.

“The existence of a conscious, transparent and global body-representation available for attentional access is a sufficient condition for MPS.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS) is related to the concept of embodiment and is the simplest form of self-consciousness.

“Here, we argue that from a strategic point of view, future research should focus on what we call 'minimal phenomenal selfhood' (MPS), which is related to the concept of embodiment and the simplest form of self-consciousness.”

May combine two claims.

MPS is partly constituted by the weak first-person perspective and is a necessary but not sufficient condition for stronger versions of the first-person perspective.

“It is important to differentiate between a weak and at least two stronger readings of 'first-person perspective', with MPS being partly constituted by the weak 1PP, and a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for stronger versions [14][15][16][17][18][19].”

• cites [14][15][16][17][18][19]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

MPS, characterized by self-identification, self-location, and weak first-person perspective, is the outcome of this process on the level of conscious experience.

“MPS, characterized by self-identification, self-location, and weak 1PP, is the outcome of this process on the level of conscious experience.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

MPS is a representation of the entire body, functionally available for global control, and provides information about new causal properties.

“MPS, the simplest form of selfhood, is a representation of the entire body, being functionally available for global control: a form of abstract (yet nonpropositional) knowledge about oneself and provides information about new causal properties.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Central defining features of MPS are a globalized form of identification with the body as a whole, spatiotemporal self-location, and a first-person perspective.

“Central defining features are, (i) a globalized form of identification with the body as a whole (as opposed to ownership for body parts), (ii) spatiotemporal self-location and (iii) a first-person perspective (1PP).”

May combine two claims.

Having MPS is a necessary condition for the strong and cognitive first-person perspective, but not for the weak first-person perspective, because the weak first-person perspective is itself a constituting factor for MPS.

“Having MPS is a necessary condition for the strong (and the cognitive) 1PP, but not for the weak 1PP because the weak 1PP is itself a constituting factor for MPS.”

• Also stated in: § Box 1. Conceptual distinctions · plain

  “We propose that MPS is a necessary condition for the strong and cognitive 1PP.”

May combine two claims.

Only global ownership, as studied in the full-body illusion, enables investigations of MPS, whereas ownership for body parts, as studied in the rubber-hand illusion, does not.

“We argue that only the latter enables investigations of MPS, with MPS being a clearer concept to guide future research.”

• cites [12] Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see, Nature sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

MPS is associated with global, fully embodied self-consciousness and is experienced as a single coherent representation of the whole, spatially situated body, not as multiple representations of separate body parts.

“MPS is associated with global, fully embodied self-consciousness and is experienced as a single feature, namely a coherent representation of the whole, spatially situated bodyand not as multiple representations of separate body parts (i.e.finger [33,36], hand [12] or hemibody [37]).”

• cites [33] Tsakiris, 2005, The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution, J. Exp. Psychol. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [36] Tastevin, 1937, En partant de l’expérience d’Aristote: les déplacements artificiels des parties du corps ne sont pas suivis par le sentiment de ces parties ni pas les sensations qu’on peut y produire, EncephaleNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [12] Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see, Nature sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [37] Brugger, 2006, From phantom limb to phantom body. Varieties of extracorporeal awareness sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

MPS is not altered in somatoparaphrenic patients and not manipulated in healthy subjects during the rubber-hand illusion because these studies do not experimentally manipulate self-location, self-identification or the weak first-person perspective.

“Accordingly, MPS is not altered in somatoparaphrenic patients and not manipulated in healthy subjects during the RHI because these studies do not experimentally manipulate self-location, self-identification or the weak 1PP [38].”

• cites [38] Blanke, 2008, Multiple self locations and perspectives, Science E-lettersNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

The temporally preceding experience of agency and global motor control causally enables MPS in practically all humans, but is not causally necessary.

“The temporally preceding experience of agency and of global motor control (e.g. in childhood) causally enables MPS in practically all humans, but it is not causally necessary (because there are other causal routes to the same phenomenon).”

May combine two claims.

Agency is not a metaphysically necessary condition for MPS, nor part of the minimal supervenience base.

“Therefore, it is not a metaphysically necessary condition for the target phenomenon to come into existence, nor part of the minimal supervenience base.”

May combine two claims.

Somatoparaphrenia and the rubber-hand illusion are only associated with changes in partial ownership and do not enable investigation of MPS as the most fundamental sense of selfhood.

“Despite their importance for the study of body ownership, somatoparaphrenia and RHI are only associated with changes in partial ownership and do not enable the investigation of MPS as the most fundamental sense of selfhood.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

What constitutes MPS is something different or less that could also take place in a disembodied, non-neural, artificial system possessing no effectors.

“Conceptually, what constitutes MPS is something different or less that could also take place in a disembodied, non-neural, artificial system possessing no effectors.”

May combine two claims.

Heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences are examples of abnormal MPS, also extending to impairments of the strong first-person perspective.

“To summarize, heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences are examples of abnormal MPS, also extending to impairments of the strong 1PP (characterized by selfidentification with an incorrect content of a global body representation).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Agency might be a sufficient condition for MPS.

“Agency might be a sufficient condition for MPS, but it does not belong to the metaphysically necessary part of the minimal supervenience base for phenomenal selfhood”

May combine two claims.

In the majority of autoscopic phenomena, MPS is characterized by a single visual weak 1PP, spatially overlapping self-location and non-ambiguous self-identification.

“In the majority of such autoscopic phenomena, MPS is characterized by a single visual weak 1PP, spatially overlapping self-location and non-ambiguous self-identification.”

May combine two claims.

Participants' self-identification and self-location was modified, leading to self-identification only with the virtual body and a drift in self-location towards the virtual body to an extracorporeal position, especially during synchronous stroking.

“Participants' self-identification and self-location was modified, leading to self-identification only with the virtual body and a drift in self-location towards the virtual body to an extracorporeal position, especially during synchronous stroking.”

• cites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

In Ehrsson's alternative set-up, this induced the experience of being at the position of the camera that was behind the subjects' body and diminished self-identification with the virtual body during synchronous stroking.

“This induced the experience of being at the position of the camera that was behind the subjects' body and diminished selfidentification with the virtual body during synchronous stroking.”

• cites [28] Ehrsson, 2007, The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

When the participants saw their body in front of themselves, being stroked synchronously (with their own back), they felt as if the virtual body was their own (illusory self-identification) and showed drift towards it (illusory self-location).

“When the participants saw their body in front of themselves, being stroked synchronously (with their own back), they felt as if the virtual body was their own (illusory self-identification) and showed drift towards it (illusory self-location).”

• cites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

In a study by Lenggenhager and colleagues, an experimental protocol similar to that in the RHI was developed for the full body (full-body illusion).

“In a study by Lenggenhager and colleagues [13], an experimental protocol similar to that in the RHI [12] was developed for the full body (full-body illusion; Figure 3b).”

• cites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [12] Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see, Nature sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Both full-body illusion measures were also observed for a fake body, but not (or less so) for a rectangular object.

“Both full-body illusion measures were also observed for a fake body (Figure 3c), but not (or less so) for a rectangular object.”

• cites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

During heautoscopy, patients can report to 'be split in two parts or selves', feeling as if 'I were two persons' or a 'split personality'.

“Especially during heautoscopy (with rapidly alternating or two simultaneous centres of projection for the weak 1PP), patients can report to 'be split in two parts or selves', feeling as if 'I were two persons' [52] or a 'split personality' [53].”

• cites [52] Pearson, 1954, Sur deux cas de phénomenes héautoscopiques consecutifs à lésions organiques, EncephaleNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [53] Lunn, 1970, Autoscopic phenomena, Acta Psychiatr. Scand. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Ehrsson used a similar set-up but stroked subjects on their chests (hidden from the view of the camera). In this full-body illusion version, subjects saw the synchronous stroking in front of the camera, inducing the experience of being at the position of the camera that was behind the subjects' body (illusory self-identification).

“Ehrsson [28] used a similar set-up but stroked subjects on their chests (hidden from the view of the camera).In this full-body illusion version, subjects saw the synchronous stroking in front of the camera, inducing the experience of being at the position of the camera that was behind the subjects' body (illusory self-identification; Figure 3d).”

• cites [28] Ehrsson, 2007, The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences, Science sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

There seems to be a continuum between transparency and opacity, which determines how realistically the content of a body representation is experienced and how strongly the dimension of self-identification is expressed.

“In particular, there seems to be a continuum between transparency and opacity, which determines how realistically the content of a body representation is experienced and how strongly the dimension of self-identification is expressed [6,7].”

• cites [6] Metzinger, 2003Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites [7] Metzinger, 2003, Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference, Phenom. Cogn. Sci. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Stratton described changes in self-location and self-identification that progressively increased over the three days of exposure.

“He described changes in selflocation and self-identification that progressively increased over the three days of exposure.”

• cites [54] Stratton, 1899, The spatial harmony of touch and sight, Mind sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Recent studies have extended clinical data on illusory global own body perceptions and studied MPS experimentally, refining the seminal self-observations made by G.M. Stratton.

“Recent studies have extended clinical data on illusory global own body perceptions and studied MPS experimentally, refining the seminal self-observations made at the end of the 19th century by G.M. Stratton (Figure 3a) [54].”

• cites [54] Stratton, 1899, The spatial harmony of touch and sight, Mind sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The presentation of stimuli in virtual reality set-ups has enabled systematic manipulations of different sensory dimensions including somatosensory, visual and perspectival cues.

“In particular, the presentation of stimuli in virtual reality set-ups has enabled systematic manipulations of different sensory dimensions including somatosensory, visual and perspectival cues.”

May combine two claims.

Global motor control or cognitive self-reference are not necessary conditions for MPS.

“Global motor control or cognitive selfreference are not necessary conditions.”

May combine two claims.

From the definition of out-of-body experiences it follows that both study protocols did neither induce an out-of-body experience nor an autoscopic hallucination, but rather a state that is comparable to heautoscopy.

“From the definition of out-of-body experiences (Box 2) it also follows that both study protocols did neither induce an out-of-body experience nor an autoscopic hallucination, but rather a state that is comparable to heautoscopy.”

May combine two claims.

Both study protocols enabled the manipulation of the key MPS-dimensions self-identification, self-location or weak 1PP, yet neither of them managed to manipulate the strong 1PP that is disturbed in heautoscopy and out-of-body experience.

“Both study protocols enabled the manipulation of the key MPS-dimensions self-identification, self-location or weak 1PP, yet neither of them managed to manipulate what we have called the strong 1PP that is disturbed in heautoscopy and out-of-body experience.”

May combine two claims.

Both studies revealed visual capture by showing that the location of the visual stroking dominates over the location of tactile stroking, leading in both cases to abnormal self-identification and, in the study of Lenggenhager et al., also to abnormal self-location.

“Both studies revealed visual capture by showing that the location of the visual stroking dominates over the location of tactile stroking, leading in both cases to abnormal self-identification and, in the study of Lenggenhager et al., also to abnormal self-location [38,57].”

• cites [38] Blanke, 2008, Multiple self locations and perspectives, Science E-lettersNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [57] Meyer, 2008, How does the brain localize the self?, Science E-lettersNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

These observations indicate that there seems to be a transient, but nevertheless complete, heautoscopic dissociation into two objects of identification, leading to a brief double instantiation of MPS (two selves) and the strong 1PP (a reduplication of the experience of being directed) that does not occur in any other form of autoscopic phenomenon.

“With respect to self-identification, these observations indicate that there seems to be a transient, but nevertheless complete, heautoscopic dissociation into two objects of identification, leading to a brief double instantiation of MPS (two selves) and the strong 1PP (a reduplication of the experience of being directed) that does not occur in any other form of autoscopic phenomenon.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

'Global owning' - functionally defined as availability of an integrated, transparent and global representation of the spatiotemporally situated body - is the simplest form of self-consciousness.

“If, as we propose, 'global owning' -functionally defined as availability of an integrated, transparent and global representation of the spatiotemporally situated bodyis the simplest form of self-consciousness, then it follows that MPS is constituted by something 'less' than agency.”