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How to Share an Intention1
Abstract
Literally sharing a single intention is easier than it seems—and fortunately so, since it seems quite impossible, at least to some philosophers. Philosophical puzzlement about how to share an intention doesn’t inhibit us from speaking of shared intention in daily life. When the Dean asks what the Philosophy Department intends to do about a vacancy in its ranks, she seems to be asking seventeen people to participate in a single intention. She is certainly not envisioning that the seventeen members of the department will arrive at seventeen individual intentions that somehow converge. And what rules out this possibility is not just that convergence among these particular people is unlikely; it’s that none of them is in a position to have an individual intention, rather than an individual preference, about how the vacancy is to be filled. How to fill the vacancy is up to the department, and so any intention on the subject must be formed and held by the group as a whole. The trick of sharing a single intention is thus essential to what the Dean has in mind.
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Cited by
Making the social world: the structure of human civilization
(2010) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-6793 · Cited by 1,313
Shared intention and personal intentions
Gilbert, M. (2009) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9372-z · Cited by 335
Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study
Livingston, P. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199278067.001.0001 · Cited by 276
Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies
Knobe, J., & Prinz, J. (2008) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y · Cited by 227
Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena
Gilbert, M. (2008) · Analyse & Kritik · doi:10.1515/auk-2008-0208 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Velleman, J. D.
- Venue
- The Possibility of Practical Reason
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2000-10-19
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 200-220
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2092815443
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 20.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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