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Explanation Beyond Causation
Abstract
Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Such causal accounts have been the received view of the nature of explanation, particularly in philosophy of science, since the 1980s. However, philosophers have recently begun to break with this causal tradition by shifting their focus to kinds of explanation that do not turn on causal information. The increasing recognition of the importance of such non-causal explanations in the sciences and elsewhere raises pressing questions for philosophers of explanation. What is the nature of non-causal explanations—and which theory best captures it? How do non-causal explanations relate to causal ones? How are non-causal explanations in the sciences related to those in mathematics and metaphysics? This volume of new essays explores answers to these and other questions at the heart of contemporary philosophy of explanation. The essays address these questions from a variety of perspectives, including general accounts of non-causal and causal explanations, as well as a wide range of detailed case studies of non-causal explanations from the sciences, mathematics and metaphysics.
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“or explained by contrastive patterns between the given data example and that of an opposing class in one iteration [130], [144] or a series thereof [49]”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [130]
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Basic Objects As Grounds: A Metaphysical Manifesto
Brewer, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.004
Introduction: Issues and Options
Cumpa, J., & Brewer, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.001
Pragmatism, Ontology and Ordinary Objects
Baker, L. R. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.011
How Can We Teach Philosophy of Science to Biologists?
Kampourakis, K., & Uller, T. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.016
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“Prominent among the growing class of non-causal, scientific explanations are mathematical explanations (Baker 2005; Pincock 2007; Lyon 2012; Reutlinger 2018).”
BackgroundA Pragmatist Perspective on Causation, Laws and Explanation
Healey, R. (2021) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-71899-2_10
Kampourakis, K., & Uller, T. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.001
Kampourakis, K., & Uller, T. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.018
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Kampourakis, K., & Uller, T. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108648981.017
Cumpa, J., & Brewer, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.014
Mathematical Explanations and Mathematical Applications
Pantsar, M. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57072-3_30
Cumpa, J., & Brewer, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.015
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Micro-level model explanation and counterfactual constraint
Schindler, S. (2022) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-022-00465-x
The The Role of Philosophy of Science in Quantitative Linguistics
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Scientific Explanation: Theoretical Issues and Practical Implications
Campaner, R. (2022) · European studies in philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-05883-7_1
Campaner, R. (2022) · European studies in philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-05883-7_7
Expanding Observability via Human-Machine Cooperation
Špelda, P., & Střítecký, V. (2022) · Axiomathes · doi:10.1007/s10516-022-09636-0
“The dependency condition would be used as a resolver of the generalisations’ support for further observability counterfactuals (cf. Reutlinger 2018, p. 79) based on the out of reference frame content sampled from a generative machine learning model.”
BackgroundMethodZámečník, L. (2023) · Teorie vědy / Theory of Science · doi:10.46938/tv.2023.567
The explanatory and heuristic power of mathematics
Marfori, M. A., Bangu, S., & Ippoliti, E. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04127-0
Towards a topological philosophy
Skowron, B., Kaczmarek, J., & Wójtowicz, K. (2023) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/meta.12651
Some Explanatory Issues with Woodward’s Notion of Intervention
Makovník, D. (2023) · International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1080/02698595.2023.2294455
“One such approach that uses the so-called Russellian criteria is o ff ered by Reutlinger (2018, 89).”
BackgroundMethodZjednodušující předpoklady v nekauzálních vysvětleních
Zach, M., & Zámečník, L. (2024) · Teorie vědy / Theory of Science · doi:10.46938/tv.2024.615
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Interdisciplinarity and Explanation
Fagan, M. B. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.003.0007
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Fagan, M. B. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.003.0009
Fagan, M. B. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.003.0008
Systems Biology: Impediments to Integration
Fagan, M. B. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.003.0012
Fagan, M. B. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.003.0001
Fagan, M. B. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.002.0005
Fagan, M. B. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.003.0004
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Fagan, M. B. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191998874.003.0003
A preservation/generation distinction about memory
Miyazono, K., & Tooming, U. (2025) · Asian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s44204-025-00292-w
“We are neutral on the nature of the “because” relation in Clause 3, but at mini‑ mum we take the relation to support a counterfactual conditional (c.f. Reutlinger, 2016, 2018); i.e. if Clause 2 was false (i.e. if S had not already been justified to believe that P by other sources of justification…”
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Grimm, S. R., Peels, R., & van Woudenberg, R. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780197749647.003.0002
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Grimm, S. R., Peels, R., & van Woudenberg, R. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780197749647.003.0001
Authority and Deference in the Humanities
Grimm, S. R., Peels, R., & van Woudenberg, R. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780197749647.003.0004
The Future of the Philosophy of the Humanities
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Perspectives, Social Constructions, Standpoints, and Truth in the Humanities
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Pantsar, M. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70658-0_30-2
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Explanationism: A Brief History
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Scientific Misunderstanding: Notes for the Bedeviled
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A Counterfactual Approach to Explanation in Mathematics
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Metadata
- Venue
- Oxford Scholarship Online
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2018-06-21
- OpenAlex
- W2604760132
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 6
- FWCI
- 29.35
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- philosophy of explanation, non-causal explanation, causal explanation, nature of explanation, scientific explanation
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