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Oxford Studies In Epistemology
Abstract
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe and Australasia, it will publish exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: *traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of scepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc; *new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; *foundational questions in decision-theory; *confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; *topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; *topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and *work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony and the ethics of belief. Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here.
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Citations
Cited by
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
Joyce, J. M. (2009) · Synthese Library · doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_11 · Cited by 331
Goldman, A. I. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9410-3 · Cited by 107
EPISTEMIC CORRUPTION AND EDUCATION
Kidd, I. J. (2019) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2018.3 · Cited by 88
Trust, trustworthiness and AI governance
Lahusen, C., Maggetti, M., & Slavkovik, M. (2024) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-024-71761-0 · Cited by 68
Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory
Heersmink, R. (2022) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12353 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2007-12-13
- OpenAlex
- W1485851585
- Cited by
- 602
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 44.09
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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