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Cited by 39Embodied and Extended CognitionCybernetics and Technology in SocietyIdentity, Memory, and Therapy

Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory

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Heersmink, Richard·2022·Mind & Language
DOI 10.1111/mila.12353
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Abstract

In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, autobiographical memory is extended or distributed.

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Cited by

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Authors
Heersmink, R.
Affiliations
La Trobe University (AU)
Corresponding author
Heersmink, Richard
ORCID
Heersmink, Richard
Venue
Mind & Language
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2020-12-28
Volume
37
Issue
4
Pages
659-673
ISSN
  • 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0017
DOI
10.1111/mila.12353
OpenAlex
W3115735375
Cited by
39
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 3
FWCI
1.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Mind & Language (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Identity, Memory, and Therapy
Keywords
extended mind, autobiographical memory, artifacts, lifelogging, distributed cognition, embodied cognition, personal experience, memory reliability

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