The Intentional Structure of Consciousness
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Abstract
Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. One feels a pain in one’s leg to be in the leg, not in the mind. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the first is not. And we also distinguish mental pain (which is normally understood as some kind of emotional distress) from the physical pain one feels in one’s body.
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Citations
Cited by
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Smithies, D. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199917662.001.0001 · Cited by 271
Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr036 · Cited by 42
Pennartz, C. M. A. (2022) · Behavioural Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2022.113969 · Cited by 40
Porath, N. (2008) · Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9655.2008.00522.x · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Crane, T.
- Venue
- Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2003-01-23
- Pages
- 33-56
- OpenAlex
- W1807140350
- Cited by
- 175
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.18
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Crane, T. (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0003
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.