Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I described an incoherence in one form of the higher order thought (HOT) theory that derives from its holding both that an appropriate higher order thought is sufficient for a conscious state and that being the object of an appropriate higher order thought is necessary for a conscious state. A (1) lone and (2) unconscious (i.e. not the object of another HOT) and (3) “empty” (i.e. reference-failing) higher order thought at t determines a conscious state at t, but – contrary to the necessary condition – there is no thought at t about that conscious state – unless the lone thought is about itself. But such self-reference would collapse the HOT theory into the rival same-order theory. As I noted in the article, this incoherence is resolvable by saying, as Weisberg and Rosenthal do, that when I have a lone unconscious empty higher order thought, what is conscious is the non-existent object of the HOT. Any theory can be made coherent by adopting sufficiently implausible views. Even contradiction can be made coherent by adopting Dialetheism and a paraconsistent logic.
Overview
Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“On this Blockian diagnosis, what would seem required for the requisite intimacy with our first-order states-to make them conscious-is the removal of one layer of qualitative content, namely that pertaining to the HOT.”
From The merits of higher-order thought theories (2018) · cites this paper as BLOCK, 2011, p. 447
In the citing paper
“In this light it can be seen that the Block-Kriegel line of objection actually begs the question.”
From The merits of higher-order thought theories (2018) · cites this paper as BLOCK, 2011b
Citations
Cites
The Neural Substrate of Human Empathy: Effects of Perspective-taking and Cognitive Appraisal
Lamm, C., Batson, C. D., & Decety, J. (2007) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2007.19.1.42 · Cited by 1,464 · cited 1×
“…pain with no tissue damage, and this can be at least partially explained by the fact that both components of pain, the sensory and affective components, can be activated without tissue damage when the subject is watching others apparently subjected to nightmarish stimuli (Lamm et al. 2007).”
BackgroundConsciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Self-citationPhilosophy of Mind : Classical and Contemporary Readings
Chalmers, D. J. (2021) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 994
Two neural correlates of consciousness
Block, N. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006 · Cited by 713 · cited 1×
“I favour a neurally based account of what makes representations conscious (Block 2005, 2009) when they are conscious.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Intentional Structure of Consciousness
Crane, T. (2003) · Consciousness · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0003 · Cited by 175
A higher order Bayesian decision theory of consciousness
Lau, H. C. (2007) · Progress in Brain Research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(07)68004-2 · Cited by 172 · cited 1×
“However, given the problems I have pointed out, those who like the higher order picture should consider the opposite move advocated by Hakwan Lau (2008, 2010) in which a higher order probabilistic 'pointer' that has no content of its own refers to a first order representation.”
BackgroundComparing the Major Theories of Consciousness
Block, N. J. (2009) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8029.003.0099 · Cited by 126
Self-citationBillock, V. A., Gleason, G. A., & Tsou, B. H.-P. (2001) · Journal of the Optical Society of America A · doi:10.1364/josaa.18.002398 · Cited by 92
Theoretical motivations for investigating the neural correlates of consciousness
Lau, H. (2011) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.93 · Cited by 24
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- 2009, THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, vol. 4, 1111
- 2007, THE JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 191, 42
- 2010, WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 21, 1
Cited by
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Self-citationThe HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness
Brown, R. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0388-7 · Cited by 83
“This interpretation of higher-order theories is explicitly endorsed by many fans and critics of the theory alike (Balog 2000; Lycan 2004; Gennaro 2004; Carruther 2008; Mandik 2009; Matey 2011; Block 2011a; Kriegel 2011; Kidd 2011).”
BackgroundHigher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function
Rosenthal, D. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0353 · Cited by 64
Quotational higher-order thought theory
Coleman, S. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0441-1 · Cited by 58
“What these accounts share is two levels of qualitative content (cf. Block 2011; Brown 2012), one of which inevitably conflicts with the other, and representation, which creates distance from one’s subject-matter.”
BackgroundConsciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg
Berger, J. (2013) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.771241 · Cited by 41
“…HOT cannot make one aware of a first-order state because, again, no such state exists.5 Many have concluded that HOT theory is unworkable (e.g., Block, 2011a; Byrne, 1997; Kriegel, 2003; Levine, 2001; Neander, 1998), but Wilberg argues that there is an underappreciated aspect of the account…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Block, N.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Block, N.
- ORCID
- Block, N.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-16
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 443-448
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2134743858
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 2.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Analysis (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- higher-order thought theory, consciousness, self-reference, dialetheism, paraconsistent logic, reference failure
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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