The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933
Abstract
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibits commercial banks from underwriting, holding, or dealing in corporate securities, either directly or through securities affiliates.1 The driving force behind the Act was Senator Carter Glass, who strongly believed that direct commerical-bank involvement with corporate securities was detrimental to the stability of the financial system. The commingling of investment and commercial banking functions, Glass and others argued, creates significant conflicts of interest. This view gained popular support after the Pecora Committee investigations (U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 1933-1934) into the potentially conflictladen and putatively abusive practices at securities affiliates of the two most prominent national banks, National City Company and Chase Securities Company.
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Cites
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Aitkin, M., Kalbfleisch, J. D., & Prentice, R. L. (1981) · Biometrics · doi:10.2307/2530581 · Cited by 9,877
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x · Cited by 4,055
The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900-1929
White, E. N. (1983) · doi:10.1515/9781400857449 · Cited by 298
Before the Glass-Steagall Act: An analysis of the investment banking activities of national banks
White, E. N. (1986) · Explorations in Economic History · doi:10.1016/0014-4983(86)90018-5 · Cited by 202
The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking
Benston, G. J. (1990) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-11280-7 · Cited by 163
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Forer, M. L., & Dewing, A. S. (1954) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/793792 · Cited by 106
The Security Affiliates of National Banks.
Trefftzs, K. L., & Peach, W. N. (1941) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2278978 · Cited by 91
Corporate promotions and reorganizations
Dewing, A. S. (2010) · Cited by 40
Macey, J. R., & Miller, G. P. (1997) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 32
The Myth of the Security Affiliate
Edwards, G. W. (1942) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1942.10500629 · Cited by 17
Cited by
The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00125-9 · Cited by 3,327
Self-citationBank regulation and supervision: what works best?
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2004) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.002 · Cited by 2,296
Berger, A. N., Demsetz, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00125-3 · Cited by 1,477
The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth
Levine, R. (1998) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2601259 · Cited by 1,198
Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes
Levine, R., Beck, T., & Loayza, N. (1999) · Policy Research Working Papers · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2059 · Cited by 1,154
Metadata
- Authors
- Kroszner, R. S., & Rajan, R. G.
- Venue
- Credit, Intermediation, and the Macroeconomy
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2004-03-25
- Pages
- 374-404
- OpenAlex
- W1570470290
- Cited by
- 513
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 94.27
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.