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Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth
Open accessAbstract
In epistemology and in philosophy of language there is fierce debate about the role of context in knowledge, understanding, and meaning. Many contemporary epistemologists take seriously the thesis that epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. This thesis is of course a semantic claim, so it has brought epistemologists into contact with work on context in semantics by philosophers of language. This volume brings together the debates, in a set of twelve specially written essays representing the latest work by leading figures in the two fields. All future work on contextualism will start here.
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Cited by
XIV*-MAKING SENSE OF RELATIVE TRUTH
MacFarlane, J. (2005) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2005.00178.x · Cited by 267
Representation of Principled Connections: A Window Onto the Formal Aspect of Common Sense Conception
Prasada, S., & Dillingham, E. M. (2009) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01018.x · Cited by 156
The Many Relativisms: Index, Context, and Beyond
de Sa, D. L. (2011) · A Companion to Relativism · doi:10.1002/9781444392494.ch6 · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2005-08-11
- OpenAlex
- W309273114
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 28.97
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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