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Cited by 156Categorization, perception, and languageChild and Animal Learning DevelopmentLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Representation of Principled Connections: A Window Onto the Formal Aspect of Common Sense Conception

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Prasada, Sandeep, Dillingham, Elaine M.·2009·Cognitive Science
DOI 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01018.x
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Abstract

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. Recent research suggests that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g., DOG) and some of its properties (k‐properties; e.g., having four legs for dogs) but not other properties (t‐properties; e.g., being brown for dogs). Principled connections differ from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections license (i) the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess their k‐properties, (ii) formal explanations (i.e., explanation of the presence of k‐properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is), and (iii) normative expectations concerning the presence of k‐properties in tokens of the type. The present paper investigates the hypothesis that representing principled connections requires representing properties as aspects of being the relevant kind of thing (Aspect Hypothesis). Experiment 1 provides a direct test of the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 provide indirect tests of the Aspect Hypothesis. All three experiments provide support for the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiment 4 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the manner in which formal explanations are licensed by principled connections. Finally, Experiment 5 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the nature of the normative expectations licensed by principled connections. Together these results provide strong evidence for the idea that representing principled connections involves representing a property as being an aspect of being a given kind of thing. The results also help clarify the manner in which formal explanation differs from other modes of explanation. Finally, the results of the experiments are used to motivate a proposal concerning the formal structure of the conceptual representations implicated by principled connections. This structure provides a domain‐general way of structuring our concepts and embodies the perspective we take when we think and talk of things as being instances of a kind.

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  • Generics may imply that a statement is normatively correct or ideal.

    “Generics may also imply that a statement is normatively correct or ideal (39,40,42,43).”

    From Generic language in scientific communication (2019) · cites this paper as [40]

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Authors
Prasada, S., & Dillingham, E. M.
Affiliations
Hunter College (US)
Corresponding author
Prasada, Sandeep
ORCID
Prasada, Sandeep
Venue
Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2009-03-25
Volume
33
Issue
3
Pages
401-448
ISSN
  • 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
  • 1551-6709
DOI
10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01018.x
OpenAlex
W2007978164
Cited by
156
References
99
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 11
FWCI
10.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • City University of New York
  • National Institutes of Health (RR03037)
  • National Center for Research Resources (RR-03037)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
Keywords
aspect hypothesis, formal explanations, normative expectations, conceptual representation, statistical explanation, logical explanation

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