Relations Between Language and Thought
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this chapter we consider the question of whether the language one speaks affects one’s thinking. We discuss arguments showing that language cannot be taken to be the vehicle of thought. We then review evidence from several domains in which language has been proposed to reorganize conceptual representations, including color, objects and substances, space, motion, number, and spatial orientation. We conclude that linguistic representations have significant online processing effects in these and other cognitive and perceptual domains but do not alter conceptual representation.
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Cites
The Structural Sources of Verb Meanings
Gleitman, L. (1990) · Language Acquisition · doi:10.1207/s15327817la0101_2 · Cited by 1,783
Self-citationThe importance of shape in early lexical learning
Landau, B., Smith, L. B., & Jones, S. S. (1988) · Cognitive Development · doi:10.1016/0885-2014(88)90014-7 · Cited by 1,174
Cited by
How language shapes the cultural inheritance of categories
Gelman, S. A., & Roberts, S. O. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1621073114 · Cited by 200
Exact number concepts are limited to the verbal count range
Pitt, B., Gibson, E., & Piantadosi, S. T. (2022) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/09567976211034502 · Cited by 26
Language is a Source of Grounding and a Mode of Action
Dove, G. (2023) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12665 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Gleitman, L., & Papafragou, A.
- Venue
- Oxford Handbooks Online
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2013-03-11
- OpenAlex
- W2133379396
- Cited by
- 46
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 2.29
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gleitman, L., & Papafragou, A. (2013). Relations Between Language and Thought. Oxford Handbooks Online. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195376746.013.0032
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