Cited by 10Economic Theory and InstitutionsDigital Platforms and EconomicsIntellectual Property Rights and Media

Open-Access and Information Commons

Benkler, Yochai·2017·The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics

Abstract

Open access commons are a family of institutional arrangements that are far more pervasive in modern complex economies than usually recognized in the economic literature. The defining characteristic of open access commons is their utilization of symmetric use privileges for an open, undefined set of users in the public, rather than asymmetric exclusive control rights located in the hands of an individual legal entity or defined group (club) use, and their primary reliance on queuing and some form of governance-based allocation, rather than price-cleared models, for congestion clearance and management. The chapter includes an overview of the commons literature, thumbnail case studies of the emergence of open access commons in the digitally networked environment, and a typology of open access commons and their proprietary parallels. The emergence of open access commons reflects the combined effect of innovation economics under highly uncertain conditions and the diversity of human motivations.

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Crossref · 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684205.013.021

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Authors
Benkler, Y.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Benkler, Yochai
Venue
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
Published
2017-04-13
Pages
255-279
OpenAlex
W2731753965
Cited by
10
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
Type
reference entry
Language
en
Open access
closed
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Intellectual Property Rights and Media
Keywords
information commons, commons governance, queueing, congestion management, club goods, digital networks, innovation economics

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