Open-Access and Information Commons
Abstract
Open access commons are a family of institutional arrangements that are far more pervasive in modern complex economies than usually recognized in the economic literature. The defining characteristic of open access commons is their utilization of symmetric use privileges for an open, undefined set of users in the public, rather than asymmetric exclusive control rights located in the hands of an individual legal entity or defined group (club) use, and their primary reliance on queuing and some form of governance-based allocation, rather than price-cleared models, for congestion clearance and management. The chapter includes an overview of the commons literature, thumbnail case studies of the emergence of open access commons in the digitally networked environment, and a typology of open access commons and their proprietary parallels. The emergence of open access commons reflects the combined effect of innovation economics under highly uncertain conditions and the diversity of human motivations.
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These informational commons resources occupy a central role in current economies.
“Estos recursos ocupan un rol central en las economías actuales (Benkler, 2017).”
From Desarrollo Floss y gobernanza de pares: el caso del entorno de escritorio Gnome (2020) · cites this paper as Benkler, 2017
Cited by
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Desarrollo Floss y gobernanza de pares: el caso del entorno de escritorio Gnome
Zanotti, A., & Vélez, J. G. (2020) · International Journal of Innovation · doi:10.5585/iji.v8i3.17114 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
- Authors
- Benkler, Y.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Benkler, Yochai
- ORCID
- Benkler, Yochai
- Venue
- The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2017-04-13
- Pages
- 255-279
- OpenAlex
- W2731753965
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
- Type
- reference entry
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Intellectual Property Rights and Media
- Keywords
- information commons, commons governance, queueing, congestion management, club goods, digital networks, innovation economics
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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