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The Formation of Cooperative Relationships
Abstract
This article investigates how individuals forge and maintain cooperative relationships when there is always the possibility of starting again with a new partner. The analysis shows that an ever-present opportunity to form new relationships need not destroy cooperation. Simple strategies achieve the (constrained) optimal level of cooperation. These strategies involve a “bond” in the form of reduced utility at the beginning of a relationship Two newly matched agents may have an incentive to forgo paying this bond, given that everyone else in the population requires payment of a bond to start a new relationship. This incentive disappears, however, if there is enough initial uncertainty about a new partner's valuation of future utility. Accounts from the sociological and anthropological literature indicate that individuals may indeed pay bonds to form cooperative relationships.
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Citations
Cites
Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., & Weingast*, B. R. (1990) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x · Cited by 1,793
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kranton, R. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-04-01
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 214-233
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2035234632
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 11.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Kranton, R. E. (1996). The Formation of Cooperative Relationships. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023358
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.