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High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector
Abstract
Transaction-cost economics currently has a strong influence on the study of private-sector institutions, but attempts to apply it to the public sector have been less successful, particularly in the area of internal organization. I argue that the standard framework of transaction-cost economics must be adjusted to the distinctive characteristics of the public sector, and that the key is a rethinking of the idea of high-powered and low-powered incentives. I show that with this extension transaction-cost economics can provide insight into such important current issues as earmarking, public authorities, and civil service personnel systems.
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Citations
Cited by
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Feiock, R. C. (2013) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/psj.12023 · Cited by 691
Creating and Capturing Value in Public-Private Ties: A Private Actor's Perspective
Kivleniece, I., & Quelin, B. V. (2012) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2011.0004 · Cited by 389
Performance of retail pharmacies in low- and middle-income Asian settings: a systematic review
Miller, R., & Goodman, C. (2016) · Health Policy and Planning · doi:10.1093/heapol/czw007 · Cited by 225
Metadata
- Authors
- Frant, H.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-07-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 365-381
- ISSN
- 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
- 1477-9803
- OpenAlex
- W2082515363
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024317
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- Frant, H. (1996). High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024317
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.