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High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector

Frant, H.·1996·Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Abstract

Transaction-cost economics currently has a strong influence on the study of private-sector institutions, but attempts to apply it to the public sector have been less successful, particularly in the area of internal organization. I argue that the standard framework of transaction-cost economics must be adjusted to the distinctive characteristics of the public sector, and that the key is a rethinking of the idea of high-powered and low-powered incentives. I show that with this extension transaction-cost economics can provide insight into such important current issues as earmarking, public authorities, and civil service personnel systems.

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Metadata

Authors
Frant, H.
Venue
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Published
1996-07-01
Volume
6
Issue
3
Pages
365-381
ISSN
  • 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
  • 1477-9803
OpenAlex
W2082515363
Cited by
190
References
0
FWCI
7.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024317
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Frant, H. (1996). High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024317

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.