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Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?

Posen, A. · 1998 · Oxford Economic Papers

Abstract

Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behavior in a sample of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variations in disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. The paper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflation are lower in countries with independent central banks. It also finds no evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignorage revenues or electoral manipulation of policy. These results raise questions about some explanations of the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation.

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Crossref · 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028650

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Metadata

Authors
Posen, A.
Venue
Oxford Economic Papers
Published
1998-07-01
Volume
50
Issue
3
Pages
335-359
ISSN
  • 0030-7653 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3812
OpenAlex
W3121979215
Cited by
214
References
4
FWCI
51.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028650
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Posen, A. (1998). Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link? Oxford Economic Papers. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028650

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.