The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?
Abstract
Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behavior in a sample of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variations in disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. The paper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflation are lower in countries with independent central banks. It also finds no evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignorage revenues or electoral manipulation of policy. These results raise questions about some explanations of the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation.
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Citations
Cites
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x · Cited by 3,610
Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence
Alesina, A., & Summers, L. H. (1993) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2077833 · Cited by 1,833
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., & Pagano, M. (1991) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344630 · Cited by 1,585
Cited by
Global Capital and National Governments
Mosley, L. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615672 · Cited by 617
Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the mystery of IPE's missing macroeconomy
Blyth, M., & Matthijs, M. (2017) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2017.1308417 · Cited by 290
Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends
Arnone, M., Laurens, B. J., Segalotto, J.-F., & Sommer, M. (2009) · IMF Staff Papers · doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25 · Cited by 289
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Klomp, J., & De Haan, J. (2010) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00597.x · Cited by 209
Metadata
- Authors
- Posen, A.
- Venue
- Oxford Economic Papers
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1998-07-01
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 335-359
- ISSN
- 0030-7653 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3812
- OpenAlex
- W3121979215
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 51.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.