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Cited by 7Ethics and Social Impacts of AILiterary and Philosophical StudiesPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

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Against willing servitude: Autonomy in the ethics of advanced artificial intelligence

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Bales, Adam·2025·The Philosophical Quarterly
DOI 10.1093/pq/pqaf031
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Abstract

Some people believe that advanced artificial intelligence systems (AIs) might, in the future, come to have moral status. Further, humans might be tempted to design such AIs that they serve us, carrying out tasks that make our lives better. This raises the question of whether designing AIs with moral status to be willing servants would problematically violate their autonomy. In this paper, I argue that it would in fact do so.

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Metadata

Authors
Bales, A.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Bales, Adam
ORCID
Bales, Adam
Venue
The Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2025-03-31
ISSN
  • 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9213
DOI
10.1093/pq/pqaf031
OpenAlex
W4409020462
Cited by
7
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 3
FWCI
7.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
The Philosophical Quarterly (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
AI ethics, moral status of AI, autonomy, AI design, personhood, moral status

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Against willing servitude: Autonomy in the ethics of advanced artificial intelligence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/pq/pqaf031
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Bales, A. (2025). Against willing servitude: Autonomy in the ethics of advanced artificial intelligence. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaf031