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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 116 of the 117 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 42 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

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Published version of a preprint

Abstract

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper reports a survey of 166 consciousness researchers at ASSC 2018/2019 about definitions, theories, methods, and broader assumptions in consciousness science. It finds substantial disagreement on core concepts, but some common preferences: subjective report is favored as a dependent measure, predictive processing theory is rated most promising, and most respondents endorse machines, animal continuity, and extensive unconscious processing as possible.

## Key findings

  • The survey analyzed responses from 166 consciousness researchers; the questionnaire had 22 main questions and was administered between June 2018 and August 2019.
  • On definitions, there was no consensus on key issues: 60.6% endorsed phenomenal content beyond cognitive access, 34.5% said consciousness requires higher-order states, 24.2% said response bias is part of conscious experience, and 33.5% endorsed a sharp boundary between unconscious and conscious processing.
  • On explanatory claims, 67.5% endorsed an explanatory gap, 67.3% endorsed a complete biophysical explanation of consciousness, and 71.5% endorsed the idea that consciousness evolved because it has an adaptive function.
  • On theory and method, Predictive processing theory was rated most promising (61.3% promising), followed by global workspace theory (58.0%) and higher-order theories (53.8%); for measurement, respondents preferred subjective report (“whether the stimulus is seen”) over objective measures, and for neural signatures they most often chose neural integration/complexity measures, late ERP components, and long-range synchrony.
  • On broader beliefs, 67.1% thought machines could have consciousness, 89.6% thought Mary learns something new, and most respondents judged consciousness to be a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom; for unconscious processing, a majority believed many functions can occur unconsciously, including some higher-level ones, though working memory (47.9% yes), thinking (31.9% yes), and metacognition (33.8% yes) were more contested.

## Methods

  • Design: An online/paper survey of consciousness researchers and philosophers, focused on theoretical foundations, methodological preferences, and core issues in consciousness science.
  • Sample/data: 307 total responses were received; the main analysis reported the 166 respondents who attended ASSC 2018/2019 and self-identified as consciousness researchers. The sample was a self-selected convenience sample drawn mainly from ASSC attendees.
  • Analysis: The authors calculated frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations for Likert items; used Spearman correlations for relationships among responses; used ordinal regression to compare junior vs. senior researchers; and ran a network analysis of theory evaluations using EBICglasso plus a principal component analysis to check clustering.

## Limitations

  • The paper explicitly states that the sample was a self-selected convenience sample of ASSC attendees and that it was not formally established to be representative of consciousness scientists and philosophers at large.
  • The authors note that the questionnaire was shortened to limit completion time, so some potentially informative questions were omitted; they specifically mention not asking respondents about their commitments to the mind–brain relationship or asking for an explicit working definition of consciousness.
  • Evident from the text: the survey mainly targeted ASSC attendees in 2018 and 2019 and thus may overrepresent people already engaged in that conference community; the paper also notes that some questions may have been ambiguous (for example, “explanatory gap” and “promising”).

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/nc/niac011

Cites

116 of 117 references verified0 citation errors · 1 not checkable

Statistics

Figures

Figure 1. Background variables. Five questions were included in the survey to obtain background characteristics of the respondents (N = 166). ‘Expertise’ and ‘Methods’ questions had tick boxes answer options, allowing for multiple responses. See the ‘Methods and Materials’ section and Supplementary Table S1 for a complete overview
Figure 1. Background variables. Five questions were included in the survey to obtain background characteristics of the respondents (N = 166). ‘Expertise’ and ‘Methods’ questions had tick boxes answer options, allowing for multiple responses. See the ‘Methods and Materials’ section and Supplementary Table S1 for a complete overviewCC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 2. General questions. Eleven questions were included in the survey to explore how consciousness researchers perceive their object of study. For all questions except ‘Transition’, a 5-point Likert scale was used ranging from ‘definitely yes’ (dark green) to ‘definitely not’ (red). Mean score is indicated on the bars. For ‘Transition’, three answer options were provided: ‘sharp boundary’ (dark green), ‘neutral’ (grey), and ‘continuous transition’ (red). Note that questions are sometimes summarized in the figure legend due to space constraints of the figure. See Supplementary Table S1 for a complete overview and exact formulation of all questions
Figure 2. General questions. Eleven questions were included in the survey to explore how consciousness researchers perceive their object of study. For all questions except ‘Transition’, a 5-point Likert scale was used ranging from ‘definitely yes’ (dark green) to ‘definitely not’ (red). Mean score is indicated on the bars. For ‘Transition’, three answer options were provided: ‘sharp boundary’ (dark green), ‘neutral’ (grey), and ‘continuous transition’ (red). Note that questions are sometimes summarized in the figure legend due to space constraints of the figure. See Supplementary Table S1 for a complete overview and exact formulation of all questionsCC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 3. Theories of consciousness. (Left) We asked participants to indicate whether they regarded a theoretical position as promising for 10 different consciousness theories on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘definitely yes’ (dark green) to ‘definitely not’ (red). Mean score is indicated on the bars. (Right) Network analysis of theories of consciousness. Thicker darker edges represent stronger weights. The largest weight (between HOT and GNWT) equals 0.47. See left for node abbreviations. See Supplementary Table S3 for the weights matrix of the network analysis
Figure 3. Theories of consciousness. (Left) We asked participants to indicate whether they regarded a theoretical position as promising for 10 different consciousness theories on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘definitely yes’ (dark green) to ‘definitely not’ (red). Mean score is indicated on the bars. (Right) Network analysis of theories of consciousness. Thicker darker edges represent stronger weights. The largest weight (between HOT and GNWT) equals 0.47. See left for node abbreviations. See Supplementary Table S3 for the weights matrix of the network analysisCC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 4. Methodology questions. Three questions were included in the survey to explore how consciousness researchers experimentally manipulate and study consciousness. For these questions, participants were asked to rank their preferred answer options by placing the numbers 1, 2, and 3 in front of the options of their choice (ranging from dark blue to light blue)
Figure 4. Methodology questions. Three questions were included in the survey to explore how consciousness researchers experimentally manipulate and study consciousness. For these questions, participants were asked to rank their preferred answer options by placing the numbers 1, 2, and 3 in front of the options of their choice (ranging from dark blue to light blue)CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 5. Outcome questions. Three questions assessed participants’ opinions about outcomes of consciousness research for multiple items. Five-point Likert scales were used ranging from ‘definitely yes’ (dark green) to ‘definitely not’ (red). Mean score is indicated on the bars
Figure 5. Outcome questions. Three questions assessed participants’ opinions about outcomes of consciousness research for multiple items. Five-point Likert scales were used ranging from ‘definitely yes’ (dark green) to ‘definitely not’ (red). Mean score is indicated on the barsCC BY-NC · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

Show all 117 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Block, 1996, How can we find the neural correlate of consciousness?, Trends Neurosci, 19, 456
  2. Edelman, 2009, Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach, Trends Neurosci, 32, 476, 10.1016/j.tins.2009.05.008 · DOI · Paper page
  3. Kirk, 2019, Zombies
  4. Tsuchiya, 2015, No-report paradigms: extracting the true neural correlates of consciousness, Trends Cogn Sci, 19, 757, 10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002 · DOI · Paper page

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Metadata

Authors
Francken, J. C., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J. D., Seth, A. K., & van Gaal, S.
Affiliations
  • Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
  • Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (NL)
  • Amsterdam UMC Location University of Amsterdam (NL)
  • Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CA)
Corresponding author
  • Francken, Jolien C
  • van Gaal, Simon
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Published
2022-01-01
Volume
2022
Issue
1
Pages
niac011-niac011
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4291127700
Cited by
136
References
117
Citations by year
2026: 41 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 10
FWCI
87.30
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Sussex Research Online (University of Sussex) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
  • VU Research Portal (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Research Talent Grant 406.17.109)
  • Universiteit van Amsterdam (Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Talent Grant)
  • European Research Council (ERC Starting Grant 715605)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
Keywords
consciousness studies, theory of consciousness, definition of consciousness, artificial consciousness, unconscious processes, consciousness assessment, researcher attitudes

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/nc/niac011
The paper
Francken, J. C., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J. D., Seth, A. K., & van Gaal, S. (2022). An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neuroscience of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niac011

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