The DOI matches its Crossref record; 116 of the 117 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 42 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
Abstract
We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper reports a survey of 166 consciousness researchers at ASSC 2018/2019 about definitions, theories, methods, and broader assumptions in consciousness science. It finds substantial disagreement on core concepts, but some common preferences: subjective report is favored as a dependent measure, predictive processing theory is rated most promising, and most respondents endorse machines, animal continuity, and extensive unconscious processing as possible.
## Key findings
- The survey analyzed responses from 166 consciousness researchers; the questionnaire had 22 main questions and was administered between June 2018 and August 2019.
- On definitions, there was no consensus on key issues: 60.6% endorsed phenomenal content beyond cognitive access, 34.5% said consciousness requires higher-order states, 24.2% said response bias is part of conscious experience, and 33.5% endorsed a sharp boundary between unconscious and conscious processing.
- On explanatory claims, 67.5% endorsed an explanatory gap, 67.3% endorsed a complete biophysical explanation of consciousness, and 71.5% endorsed the idea that consciousness evolved because it has an adaptive function.
- On theory and method, Predictive processing theory was rated most promising (61.3% promising), followed by global workspace theory (58.0%) and higher-order theories (53.8%); for measurement, respondents preferred subjective report (“whether the stimulus is seen”) over objective measures, and for neural signatures they most often chose neural integration/complexity measures, late ERP components, and long-range synchrony.
- On broader beliefs, 67.1% thought machines could have consciousness, 89.6% thought Mary learns something new, and most respondents judged consciousness to be a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom; for unconscious processing, a majority believed many functions can occur unconsciously, including some higher-level ones, though working memory (47.9% yes), thinking (31.9% yes), and metacognition (33.8% yes) were more contested.
## Methods
- Design: An online/paper survey of consciousness researchers and philosophers, focused on theoretical foundations, methodological preferences, and core issues in consciousness science.
- Sample/data: 307 total responses were received; the main analysis reported the 166 respondents who attended ASSC 2018/2019 and self-identified as consciousness researchers. The sample was a self-selected convenience sample drawn mainly from ASSC attendees.
- Analysis: The authors calculated frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations for Likert items; used Spearman correlations for relationships among responses; used ordinal regression to compare junior vs. senior researchers; and ran a network analysis of theory evaluations using EBICglasso plus a principal component analysis to check clustering.
## Limitations
- The paper explicitly states that the sample was a self-selected convenience sample of ASSC attendees and that it was not formally established to be representative of consciousness scientists and philosophers at large.
- The authors note that the questionnaire was shortened to limit completion time, so some potentially informative questions were omitted; they specifically mention not asking respondents about their commitments to the mind–brain relationship or asking for an explicit working definition of consciousness.
- Evident from the text: the survey mainly targeted ASSC attendees in 2018 and 2019 and thus may overrepresent people already engaged in that conference community; the paper also notes that some questions may have been ambiguous (for example, “explanatory gap” and “promising”).
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9 Valid · 2 Not valid · 12 Not checked · 127 Own results and interpretations
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“conceptual choices and assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon under study have a significant influence on which experiments are conducted and how their outcomes are interpreted (Barrett 2009; Irvine 2013; Francken and Slors 2014; Abend 2017).”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Barrett 2009 source
The Conclusions section states that the categories used to investigate mind and behavior influence the questions researchers ask, the experiments they design, and their interpretation of data. This directly supports the paraphrase; page numbers are not supplied in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.94)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Irvine 2013 source
- Supportedcites Francken and Slors 2014 source
Section 2.2 (p. 4) explains that cognitive concepts are operationalised through experimental tasks, shaping what researchers investigate. Section 4.4 (pp. 9–10) explains that interpreting those operationalisations as concepts such as attention or consciousness changes what conclusions are drawn from an experiment. (LLM, conf=0.89)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Interestingly, ‘Predictive processing theory’ (PPT) was in fact not an elaborate, existing theory in the scientific community of consciousness researchers when we surveyed our respondents (Williford et al. 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020).”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Results > General questions
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites Williford et al. 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The ‘PCM and the Functional Features—Active Inference and FE Minimization’ section discusses existing predictive-coding, active-inference, and Bayesian-brain approaches, but does not establish whether a theory called ‘Predictive processing theory’ was elaborated or recognized among consciousness researchers when the survey was conducted. I searched for the theory’s name and the claim about its status; the cited paper does not address that survey-time claim. (LLM, conf=0.73)
- Partly supportedcites Hohwy and Seth 2020 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4 says predictive processing was not first and foremost a theory of consciousness, and Section 6 describes formulations directed at consciousness as emerging and basic. These passages support the distinction from an established, elaborate consciousness theory, but do not establish its status when the respondents were surveyed. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“As a consequence, by starting off with different conceptualizations of consciousness, researchers may not be investigating the same phenomenon even though the same overarching label is used (‘consciousness’) (Figdor 2013; Irvine 2013; Francken and Slors 2014).”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Discussion
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Figdor 2013 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Irvine 2013 source
- Supportedcites Francken and Slors 2014 source
The Introduction (p. 3) says that researchers can arrive at incompatible operationalisations of ‘the same’ cognitive concept. The Conclusion (p. 11) specifically identifies consciousness as a broad concept whose experimental operationalisations capture only parts of it. Together, these passages support the claim that studies using the same label may investigate different aspects of consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.92)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“despite the fact that—at the time the survey was conducted—most varieties of PPT were not first and foremost theories of consciousness (Seth and Tsakiris 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020)”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Discussion
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Seth and Tsakiris 2018 source
- Could not verifycites Williford et al. 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Methodology section describes this paper’s Projective Consciousness Model as, above all, a theory of consciousness. Our copy does not assess whether most varieties of PPT were primarily theories of consciousness when the survey was conducted; searches for that broader comparison found no such passage. (LLM, conf=0.72)
- Partly supportedcites Hohwy and Seth 2020 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4, “Theories of consciousness” (page unavailable), explicitly says predictive processing is “not first and foremost a theory of consciousness.” It does not assess how many varieties of PPT fit that description or relate the point to when the survey was conducted. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Interestingly, the senior researchers that we surveyed are more inclined to think of the transition between conscious and unconscious processing as a sharp boundary as compared to our sample of junior researchers, once more demonstrating a lack of consensus (senior: mean: 3.26, SD: 1.76, ‘sharp boundary’ responses: 32.6%; junior: mean: 3.75, SD: 1.67, ‘sharp boundary’ responses: 22.8%; Wald χ2 = 6”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Results > General questions
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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In the citing paper
“Re fi ning these theories, which are among the most in fl uential in the fi eld [12,13,35], has driven signi fi cant methodological progress [36].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [35]
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In the citing paper
“In humans, analogous subjective reports, that is to say reports in which a subject describes their own experiences, are often considered by researchers to be a gold-standard marker of consciousness (Francken et al., 2022;Overgaard and Sorensen, 2004), notwithstanding their susceptibility to error (Schwitzgebel, 2008).”
From Does It Make Sense to Speak of Introspection in Large Language Models? (2025) · cites this paper as Francken et al., 2022
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Such advantages may be particularly apt for driving progress in a field such as consciousness science (Corcoran et al., 2023), where there is widespread disagreement about the way consciousness should be operationalised and the kinds of data that are relevant for theory development and critique (Francken et al., 2022; Irvine, 2017; Yaron et al., 2022).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Francken et al., 2022
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Consistentr(52) = 0.96reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r(52) = 0.96, p < .001”
- Consistentr(52) = 0.93reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r(52) = 0.93, p < .001”
- Consistentr(52) = 0.92reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r(52) = 0.92, p < .001”
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
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Citations
Cites
(1988) · Cited by 3,656
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 3×
“To illustrate, it is currently debated whether conscious states, by definition, need to be reportable (Block 1995; Lamme 2006; Tsuchiya et al. 2015a; Pitts et al. 2018).”
BackgroundA sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126
A tutorial on regularized partial correlation networks
Epskamp, S., & Fried, E. I. (2018) · Psychological Methods · doi:10.1037/met0000167 · Cited by 2,918 · cited 1×
“The EBICglasso estimator was used to fit a Graphical Gaussian model to the partial polychoric correlation matrix of the data (Foygel and Drton 2010; Epskamp and Fried 2018).”
MethodLycan, W. G., & Dennett, D. C. (1993) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185913 · Cited by 2,638
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 6×
“how it should be operationalized), what would constitute an explanation, and how valid experiments should be designed (Block 1995; Chalmers 1995, 2000; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dennett 2001; Lamme 2006; Tononi 2008; Dehaene and Changeux 2011; Doerig et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth 2020); see Seth and Bayne (2022) for a…”
BackgroundInfluentialJackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
The Egyptian Labor Market in an Era of Revolution
Assaad, R. A., & Krafft, C. (2015) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.1093/acprof · Cited by 2,442
The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing
Lamme, V. A. F., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2000) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/s0166-2236(00)01657-x · Cited by 2,338
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Block, 1996, How can we find the neural correlate of consciousness?, Trends Neurosci, 19, 456
- Edelman, 2009, Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach, Trends Neurosci, 32, 476, 10.1016/j.tins.2009.05.008 · DOI · Paper page
- Kirk, 2019, Zombies
- Tsuchiya, 2015, No-report paradigms: extracting the true neural correlates of consciousness, Trends Cogn Sci, 19, 757, 10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
Self-citationMelloni, L., Mudrik, L., Pitts, M., Bendtz, K., Ferrante, O., Gorska, U., Hirschhorn, R., Khalaf, A., Kozma, C., Lepauvre, A., et al. (2023) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0268577 · Cited by 113
Consciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience
Bayne, T., Frohlich, J., Cusack, R., Moser, J., & Naci, L. (2023) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.08.018 · Cited by 106
“This failure of theoretical convergence would not be problematic if the field were moving towards consensus, but that does not appear to be the case [22,23].”
The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness as PseudosciencePreprint
IIT-Concerned, Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Goodale, M. A., Lau, H. C., LeDoux, J. E., Lee, A., Michel, M., Owen, A. M., Peters, M. A. K., et al. (2023) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/zsr78 · Cited by 103
Metadata
- Authors
- Francken, J. C., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J. D., Seth, A. K., & van Gaal, S.
- Affiliations
- Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (NL)
- Amsterdam UMC Location University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Francken, Jolien C
- van Gaal, Simon
- ORCID
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2022-01-01
- Volume
- 2022
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niac011-niac011
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC9374479
- OpenAlex
- W4291127700
- Cited by
- 136
- References
- 117
- Citations by year
- 2026: 41 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 10
- FWCI
- 87.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Sussex Research Online (University of Sussex) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
- VU Research Portal (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Research Talent Grant 406.17.109)
- Universiteit van Amsterdam (Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Talent Grant)
- European Research Council (ERC Starting Grant 715605)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Keywords
- consciousness studies, theory of consciousness, definition of consciousness, artificial consciousness, unconscious processes, consciousness assessment, researcher attitudes
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