Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise
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Abstract
We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: when (1) there exists an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries.
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Cites
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
Cited by
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HABER, S., & MENALDO, V. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000584 · Cited by 1,128
Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553041382175 · Cited by 757
GALOR, O., MOAV, O., & VOLLRATH, D. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00506.x · Cited by 746
Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions
Przeworski, A. (2009) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123408000434 · Cited by 425
The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond
Capoccia, G., & Ziblatt, D. (2010) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414010370431 · Cited by 403
Metadata
- Authors
- Llavador, H., & Oxoby, R. J.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-08-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1155-1189
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2268687584
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 21.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Llavador, H., & Oxoby, R. J. (2005). Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.3.1155
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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