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Cited by 711

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data

Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., Rasul, I.·2005·The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers' productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others, with their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of the average worker is at least 50 percent higher under piece rates than under relative incentives. We show that this is due to workers partially internalizing the negative externality their effort imposes on others under relative incentives, especially when working alongside their friends. Under piece rates, the relationship among workers does not affect productivity. Further analysis reveals that workers internalize the externality only when they can monitor others and be monitored. This rules out pure altruism as the underlying motive of workers' behavior.

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Metadata

Authors
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2005-08-01
Volume
120
Issue
3
Pages
917-962
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2052386467
Cited by
711
References
2
FWCI
65.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/qje/120.3.917
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Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2005). Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.3.917

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.