Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Abstract
Casual evidence as well as daily experience suggest that many people have a strong aversion against being the 'sucker' in social dilemma situations. As a consequence, those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding, even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities. A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that there is indeed a widespread willingness of the cooperators to punish the free-riders. Our results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. In addition, we provide evidence that free-riders are punished the more heavily the more they deviate from the cooperation levels of the cooperators. Potential free-riders, therefore, can avoid or at least reduce punishment by increasing their cooperation levels. This, in turn, suggests that in the presence of punishment opportunities there will be less free riding. Testing this conjecture is the other major aim of our paper.
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Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance.
“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [14]
When the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds.
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [14]
A few individuals who free ride in the first round trigger further free riding in subsequent rounds.
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [14]
Costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games, which shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.
“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [44]
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“Further mechanisms that have been suggested to enforce cooperation are punishment including peer- and pool-punishment [9–15], reward [16–18], and policing [19].”
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Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W. T., & Vesterlund, L. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157142 · Cited by 608 · see citing works
Rode, J., Gómez‐Baggethun, E., & Krause, T. (2014) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.11.019 · Cited by 592 · see citing works
“Frey (1992), Rodríguez-Sickert et al.”
BackgroundWhy be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation
Stevens, J. R., & HAUSER, M. D. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.003 · Cited by 564 · see citing works
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
Sutter, M., HAIGNER, S. D., & Kocher, M. G. (2010) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00608.x · Cited by 545 · see citing works
“Like Fehr and Gächter (2000), we also observe a positive, but relatively small number of low contributors that punish high contributors.”
BackgroundInfluentialPromises and lies: Restoring violated trust
Schweitzer, M. E., Hershey, J. C., & Bradlow, E. T. (2006) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.05.005 · Cited by 548 · see citing works
“…are members of the same social network (Bowles & Gintis, 2004), such as from the same neighborhood; when participants have the ability to punish a free-riding counterpart (Fehr & Gachter, 2000); and when participants initiate an interaction by cooperating with each other (Clark & Sefton, 2001).”
BackgroundThe company of strangers: a natural history of economic life
Seabright, P. (2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1685 · Cited by 530 · see citing works
Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations
Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. M. (2007) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131812 · Cited by 529 · see citing works
“In order to test whether self-regarding motives or strong reciprocity drives punishment, Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) conducted experiments in which the group composition changed randomly from period to period in such a way that no subject ever encountered another subject more than once.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationReciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Guala, F. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000069 · Cited by 511 · see citing works
“Many of these analyses deal with what could be called " simple costly punishment " ; that is, punishers pay a cost to induce a cost on the punished (Dreber et al. 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2000a; Rand et al. 2009a; Rockenbach & Milinski 2006; Wu et al. 2009).”
InfluentialMoshagen, M., Hilbig, B. E., & Zettler, I. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000111 · Cited by 519 · see citing works
“…some immediate gain) rather than defect in a social dilemma situation (Kollock, 1998), for example, to build a certain reputation (e.g., Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1996; Moshagen, Hilbig, & Musch, 2011) or to avoid sanctions (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 2012).”
BackgroundHandbook of Management Accounting Research
(2009) · Handbooks of management accounting research · doi:10.1016/s1751-3243(07)x0001-4 · Cited by 512 · see citing works
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications
Fehr, E. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol0521818729.007 · Cited by 506 · see citing works
Self-citationEmotion expression in human punishment behavior
Xiao, E., & Houser, D. E. (2005) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0502399102 · Cited by 505 · see citing works
Collective action and the evolution of social norms
Elinor Ostrom, B. (2014) · Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research · doi:10.1080/19390459.2014.935173 · Cited by 508 · see citing works
The personal norm of reciprocity
Perugini, M., Gallucci, M., Presaghi, F., & Ercolani, A. P. (2003) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.474 · Cited by 501 · see citing works
The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment
Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05229 · Cited by 489 · see citing works
Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game
Tavoni, A., Dannenberg, A., Kallis, G., & Löschel, A. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1102493108 · Cited by 497 · see citing works
Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness
McCullough, M. E., Kurzban, R., & Tabak, B. A. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002160 · Cited by 480 · see citing works
Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment
Gächter, S., & Herrmann, B. (2008) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0275 · Cited by 468 · see citing works
“(iii) The strategic nature of interaction (repeated interaction versus one-shot interaction) matters for cooperation but not much for punishment (Fehr & Gächter 2000).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationCoordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., & Bowles, S. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1183665 · Cited by 613 · see citing works
Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation
Fowler, J. H. (2005) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0500938102 · Cited by 473 · see citing works
How much do we care about absolute versus relative income and consumption?
Alpízar, F., Carlsson, F., & Johansson‐Stenman, O. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2002.10.007 · Cited by 471 · see citing works
Karlan, D., Möbius, M., Rosenblat, T., & Szeidl, Á. (2009) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1307 · Cited by 471 · see citing works
A Burden of Responsibility: The Role of Social Approval at the Onset of a Crisis
Bundy, J. N., & Pfarrer, M. D. (2014) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2013.0027 · Cited by 462 · see citing works
“…breaking point, compelling evaluators to enact “durable changes to the rules” and to punish a lower-approval organization for its repeated failures (Ballinger & Rockmann, 2010: 374; Braithwaite, 1989; Davidson, Worrell, & Lee, 1994; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008).”
BackgroundThe impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on public good contributions: evidence from the lab
Cherry, T. L., Kroll, S., & Shogren, J. F. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.010 · Cited by 460 · see citing works
Normative foundations of human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schurtenberger, I. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5 · Cited by 434 · see citing works
Self-citationEvolutionary Psychology: New Perspectives on Cognition and Motivation
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131628 · Cited by 453 · see citing works
The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation
Egas, M., & Riedl, A. M. (2008) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2007.1558 · Cited by 459 · see citing works
“Previous work (Fehr & Gächter 2000, 2002), however, indicates that at least in environments where punishment is relatively cheap and has strong impact, the frequency of altruistic punishment is surprisingly high, stimulating high contribution rates in the public good game.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe Simulation of Smiles (SIMS) model: Embodied simulation and the meaning of facial expression
Niedenthal, P. M., Mermillod, M., Maringer, M., & Hess, U. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000865 · Cited by 618 · see citing works
Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting
Sprinkle, G. B. (2003) · Accounting Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(01)00058-7 · Cited by 454 · see citing works
Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-economic background: survey and experimental evidence
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B., & Thöni, C. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.006 · Cited by 442 · see citing works
Self-citationKurzban, R., & Houser, D. E. (2005) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0408759102 · Cited by 437 · see citing works
Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction
Colman, A. M. (2003) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x03000050 · Cited by 426 · see citing works
Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics
Gintis, H. M. (2000) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/s0921-8009(00)00216-0 · Cited by 420 · see citing works
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2000-09-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 980-994
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122867100
- Semantic Scholar
- 475819d6223c13c466d20a80ddced737da5bf347
- Cited by
- 4,416
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 144 · 2025: 217 · 2024: 209 · 2023: 188 · 2022: 161 · 2021: 222 · 2020: 223 · 2019: 220 · 2018: 191 · 2017: 190 · 2016: 183 · 2015: 212 · 2014: 227 · 2013: 222 · 2012: 208
- FWCI
- 224.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- punishment, free-riding, public goods, cooperation, social dilemmas, costly punishment, cooperation level, experimental economics
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