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Cited by 362

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Position Auctions with Consumer Search

Athey, S., Ellison, G.·2011·The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

This article examines a model in which advertisers bid for “sponsored-link” positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.

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Crossref · 10.1093/qje/qjr028

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Metadata

Authors
Athey, S., & Ellison, G.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2011-08-01
Volume
126
Issue
3
Pages
1213-1270
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2133198311
Cited by
362
References
16
FWCI
40.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Position Auctions with Consumer Search. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/qje/qjr028
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Athey, S., & Ellison, G. (2011). Position Auctions with Consumer Search. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr028

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.