The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Position Auctions with Consumer Search
Abstract
This article examines a model in which advertisers bid for “sponsored-link” positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.
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Cites
Diamond, P. A. (1971) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90013-5 · Cited by 1,629
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.1.242 · Cited by 1,567
Varian, H. R. (2007) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.002 · Cited by 757
Demange, G., Gale, D., & Sotomayor, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261411 · Cited by 586
Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta5708 · Cited by 562
Self-citationOptimal Information Disclosure
Rayo, L., & Segal, I. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/657922 · Cited by 484
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
Aggarwal, G., Goel, A., & Motwani, R. (2006) · ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC) · doi:10.1145/1134707.1134708 · Cited by 313
Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions
Edelman, B., & Ostrovsky, M. (2007) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2006.08.008 · Cited by 270
Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet
Ellison, G. D., & Ellison, S. F. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.564742 · Cited by 256
Self-citationPaid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet
Chen, Y., & He, C. (2011) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02466.x · Cited by 240
Cited by
Ursu, R. M. (2018) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.2017.1072 · Cited by 328
Tang, M., Liu, Y., Hu, F., & Wu, B. (2023) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2023.107135 · Cited by 312
A Dynamic Model of Sponsored Search Advertising
Yao, S., & Mela, C. F. (2011) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1100.0626 · Cited by 260
Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media
Bergemann, D., & Bonatti, A. (2011) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00143.x · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Athey, S., & Ellison, G.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-08-01
- Volume
- 126
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1213-1270
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2133198311
- Cited by
- 362
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 40.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.