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Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*

Open access
Kojima, Fuhito, Pathak, Parag A., Roth, Alvin E. · 2013 · The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article’s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are sufficiently short relative to market size. We also discuss incentives in markets with couples. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of couples.

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Crossref · 10.1093/qje/qjt019

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Metadata

Authors
Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2013-08-31
Volume
128
Issue
4
Pages
1585-1632
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2142258167
Cited by
166
References
1
FWCI
38.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/qje/qjt019
The paper
Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2013). Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt019

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.