The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*
Open accessAbstract
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article’s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are sufficiently short relative to market size. We also discuss incentives in markets with couples. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of couples.
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Citations
Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
Cited by
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Kojima, F., & Pathak, P. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.608 · Cited by 362
Self-citationCentralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
Baswana, S., Chakrabarti, P. P., Chandran, S., Kanoria, Y., & Patange, U. (2019) · INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics · doi:10.1287/inte.2019.1007 · Cited by 41
Metadata
- Authors
- Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-08-31
- Volume
- 128
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1585-1632
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2142258167
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 38.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2013). Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt019
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.