Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
Abstract
The authors designed a process, based on the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, to allocate undergraduate admissions to over 500 programs in 80 technical universities in India. They also addressed complex rules regarding affirmative action by incorporating algorithmic innovations.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Indian undergraduate admissions run through joint allocation across many programmes and institutions, using exam scores, student preference rankings, and affirmative-action quotas.
“As an illustration, compared to the US undergraduate admission process of selection from a pool of candidates, the undergraduate admissions in India is done through various joint seat allocation processes, over hundreds of programmes, across dozens of universities and colleges that takes into account test scores, ordered preference lists provided by students, as well as various affirmative action”
From Re-imagining Algorithmic Fairness in India and Beyond (2021) · cites this paper as [31]
Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985 · see citing works
Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1990) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol052139015x · Cited by 1,382 · see citing works
Roth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,017 · see citing works
Peranson, E., & Roth, A. E. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 · Cited by 757 · see citing works
The New York City High School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774670167 · Cited by 655 · see citing works
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Dubins, L. E., & Freedman, D. A. (1981) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1981.11995301 · Cited by 587 · see citing works
Kagel, J. H., & Roth, A. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554719 · Cited by 221 · see citing works
The College Admissions problem with lower and common quotas
Bíró, P., Fleiner, T., Irving, R. W., & Manlove, D. F. (2010) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2010.05.005 · Cited by 191 · see citing works
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*
Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt019 · Cited by 166 · see citing works
Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
Itai Ashlagi, A., Braverman, M., & Hassidim, A. (2014) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.2014.1276 · Cited by 100 · see citing works
The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?
Hassidim, A., Marciano, D., Romm, A., et al. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.p20171027 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
College admissions with stable score-limits
Bíró, P., & Kiselgof, S. (2013) · Central European Journal of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/s10100-013-0320-9 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
Manjunath, V., & Turhan, B. (2015) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.004 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Integer Programming Methods for Special College Admissions Problems
Bíró, P., & McBride, I. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_32 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Re-imagining Algorithmic Fairness in India and Beyond
Sambasivan, N., Arnesen, E., Hutchinson, B., Doshi, T., & Prabhakaran, V. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3442188.3445896 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
- Authors
- Baswana, S., Chakrabarti, P. P., Chandran, S., Kanoria, Y., & Patange, U.
- Affiliations
- Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur (IN)
- Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur (IN)
- Indian Institute of Technology Bombay (IN)
- Columbia University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kanoria, Yashodhan
- Venue
- INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics
- Published
- 2019-09
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 338-354
- ISSN
- 0092-2102 (ISSN-L)
- 2644-0865
- 2644-0873
- OpenAlex
- W2981653371
- Cited by
- 41
- References
- 14
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 5.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics (publishedVersion)
- DSpace (IIT Bombay) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Medical Education and Admissions
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Optimization and Search Problems
- Keywords
- centralized admissions, engineering schools, deferred acceptance algorithm, matching algorithms, undergraduate admission, affirmative action, India
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
