The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Migration and Wage Effects of Taxing Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigners’ Tax Scheme in Denmark *
Open accessAbstract
This article analyzes the effects of income taxation on the international migration and earnings of top earners using a Danish preferential foreigner tax scheme and population-wide Danish administrative data. This scheme, introduced in 1991, allows new immigrants with high earnings to be taxed at a preferential flat rate for a duration of three years. We obtain two main results. First, the scheme has doubled the number of highly paid foreigners in Denmark relative to slightly less paid—and therefore ineligible—foreigners. This translates into a very large elasticity of migration with respect to 1 minus the average tax rate on foreigners, between 1.5 and 2. Second, we find compelling evidence of a negative effect of the scheme-induced reduction in the average tax rate on pretax earnings of foreign migrants at the individual level. This finding can be rationalized by a matching frictions model with wage bargaining where there is a gap between pay and marginal productivity.
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In the citing paper
“Eligibility for the scheme requires annual earnings above a threshold located around the ninety-ninth percentile of the earnings distribution.”
From Taxation and Migration: Evidence and Policy Implications (2020) · cites this paper as Kleven et al. (2014)
In the citing paper
“Initially, the scheme offered a flat income tax rate of 30 percent in lieu of the regular progressive income tax with a top marginal tax rate of 68 percent.”
From Taxation and Migration: Evidence and Policy Implications (2020) · cites this paper as Kleven et al. (2014)
In the citing paper
“The scheme could be used for a total period of up to three years, after which the taxpayer becomes subject to the ordinary income tax schedule.”
From Taxation and Migration: Evidence and Policy Implications (2020) · cites this paper as Kleven et al. (2014)
In the citing paper
“For example, based on the tax scheme to foreigners in Denmark, Kleven et al. (2014) estimates a mobility elasticity of 1.6, which under the assumptions above implies a tax rate on foreigners of only 38 percent.”
From Taxation and Migration: Evidence and Policy Implications (2020) · cites this paper as Kleven et al. (2014)
In the citing paper
“The completely parallel trends of the two different control groups, along with other tests provided in Kleven et al. (2014), are inconsistent with such a story.”
From Taxation and Migration: Evidence and Policy Implications (2020) · cites this paper as Kleven et al. (2014)
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Citations
Cites
Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness
Hall, R. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828482 · Cited by 1,439
Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?
Saez, E. (2010) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.2.3.180 · Cited by 950
Self-citationTax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax
Feldstein, M. (1999) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465399558391 · Cited by 816
Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market
Kleven, H. J., Landais, C., & Saez, E. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.1892 · Cited by 381
Self-citation
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Cited by
The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.3.3 · Cited by 834
Self-citationTaxation and the International Mobility of Inventors
Akcigit, U., Baslandze, S., & Stantcheva, S. (2016) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20150237 · Cited by 428
Kleven, H. J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015234 · Cited by 416
Self-citationDo short-term rental platforms affect housing markets? Evidence from Airbnb in Barcelona
Garcia-López, M.-À., Jofre-Monseny, J., Martínez-Mazza, R., & Segú, M. (2020) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2020.103278 · Cited by 367
The Effect of State Taxes on the Geographical Location of Top Earners: Evidence from Star Scientists
Moretti, E., & Wilson, D. J. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20150508 · Cited by 335
Metadata
- Authors
- Kleven, H. J., Landais, C., Saez, E., & Schultz, E.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-12-11
- Volume
- 129
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 333-378
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2265295982
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 42.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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