The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Excess Funds and Agency Problems: An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements
Abstract
This study investigates the excess funds hypothesis using samples of special dividends, regular dividend increases, and self-tender offers. All three types of firms tend to have funds in excess of industry norms before the events. The excess funds are largely nonrecurring for special dividend and self-tender offer firms and recurring for regular dividend increase firms. The analysis of the stock price reaction suggests that large incremental disbursements mitigate the agency problem associated with excess funds. In particular, the stock price reaction is positively related to excess funds for self-tender offers and large special dividends, but not Ž. for regular dividend increases which tend to be smaller or small special dividends.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information
MERTON, R. C. (1987) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04565.x · Cited by 5,811
Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(86)90065-6 · Cited by 5,090
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c · Cited by 4,309
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings
Opler, T. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00003-3 · Cited by 3,914
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
MILLER, M. H., & ROCK, K. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02362.x · Cited by 3,441
Cited by
Payout policy in the 21st century
Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Michaely, R. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.07.004 · Cited by 2,239
The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs
Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00645.x · Cited by 823
Decoupling Policy from Practice: The Case of Stock Repurchase Programs
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (2001) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2667086 · Cited by 814
The cash-flow permanence and information content of dividend increases versus repurchases
Guay, W. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00062-3 · Cited by 468
Payout Policy in the 21st Century
Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Michaely, R. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.571046 · Cited by 384
Metadata
- Authors
- Lie, E.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-01
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 219-248
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2079250415
- Cited by
- 254
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 33.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Excess Funds and Agency Problems: An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/13.1.219
- The paper
- Lie, E. (2000). Excess Funds and Agency Problems: An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/13.1.219
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.