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Cited by 615

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation

Allen, Franklin, Carletti, Elena, Marquez, Robert·2011·Review of Financial Studies
DOI 10.1093/rfs/hhp089
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Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that banks hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums. This did not prevent the financial crisis and underlines the importance of understanding bank capital determination. Market discipline is one of the forces that induces banks to hold positive capital. The literature has focused on the liability side. We develop a simple theory based on monitoring to show that discipline from the asset side can also be important. In perfectly competitive markets, banks can find it optimal to use costly capital rather than the interest rate on the loan to commit to monitoring because it allows higher borrower surplus.

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Metadata

Authors
Allen, F., Carletti, E., & Marquez, R.
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2009-11-23
Volume
24
Issue
4
Pages
983-1018
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhp089
OpenAlex
W2125591383
Cited by
615
References
44
FWCI
39.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/hhp089
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Allen, F., Carletti, E., & Marquez, R. (2011). Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp089

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.