The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?
Open accessAbstract
A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks' revenues from performing loans. This paper shows that when this effect is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769 · cited 2×
“Our analysis has focused on a moral hazard model of the credit market, but similar results could be derived for an adverse selection model à laStiglitz and Weiss(1981), where the average probability of default of a loan portfolio is increasing in the loan rate.”
BackgroundResultON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Merton, R. C. (1974) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x · Cited by 10,581
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 8,651
Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods
Salop, S. C. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003323 · Cited by 2,975
On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates
Merton, R. C. (1974) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2978814 · Cited by 2,751
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
Hellmann, T. F., Murdock, K. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.147 · Cited by 2,088
The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited
BOYD, J. H., & DE NICOLÓ, G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00763.x · Cited by 2,084
Basel Committee On Banking Supervision
Rost, B. (2010) · Handbook of Transnational Economic Governance Regimes · doi:10.1163/ej.9789004163300.i-1081.238 · Cited by 1,590
Allen, F., & Gale, D. M. (2001) · Cited by 1,584
Bank Competition and Financial Stability
Berger, A. N., Klapper, L. F., & Turk-Ariss, R. (2009) · Journal of Financial Services Research · doi:10.1007/s10693-008-0050-7 · Cited by 1,221
Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking
Repullo, R. (2004) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2003.08.005 · Cited by 938
Self-citationA risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital rules
Gordy, M. B. (2003) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/s1042-9573(03)00040-8 · Cited by 869
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
Hellmann, T. F., & Murdock, K. C. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.92288 · Cited by 618
Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking
Matutes, C., & Vives, X. (2000) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00057-9 · Cited by 515
Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence
Boyd, J. H., Nicolò, G. D., & Jalal, A. M. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.956761 · Cited by 323
Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence
De Nicoló, G., Jalal, A. M., Boyd, J. H., Nicoló@imf.org, G., AJalal@imf.org, & JBoyd@imf.org (2006) · IMF Working Papers · doi:10.5089/9781451865578.001 · Cited by 218
Chiappori, P.-A., Perez-Castrillo, D., & Verdier, T. (1995) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)00016-s · Cited by 191
Relationship banking, deposit insurance and bank portfolio choice
Besanko, D. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1993) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511752056.019 · Cited by 173
Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?
Perotti, E. C., & Suarez, J. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(02)00241-6 · Cited by 172
How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk Taking?Preprint
Salas, J. S., Jiménez, G., & Lopez, J. A. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.965462 · Cited by 129
Banking Competition and Market Efficiency
Yanelle, M.-O. (1997) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2971710 · Cited by 91
Hot and Cold Housing Markets: International EvidencePreprint
Ceron, J. A., & Suárez, J. (2006) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 53
Policies for Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework
Repullo, R. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528521.006 · Cited by 19
Self-citation
Cited by
How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?
Berger, A. N., & Bouwman, C. H. S. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.008 · Cited by 1,684
Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity
Beck, T., De Jonghe, O., & Schepens, G. (2013) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2012.07.001 · Cited by 1,021
On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries
Turk Ariss, R. (2010) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.09.004 · Cited by 703
Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific
Fu, X. (., Lin, Y. (., & Molyneux, P. (2014) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.09.012 · Cited by 608
How does competition affect bank risk-taking?
Jiménez, G., Lopez, J. A., & Saurina, J. (2013) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2013.02.004 · Cited by 588
Metadata
- Authors
- Martinez-Miera, D., & Repullo, R.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-08-18
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 3638-3664
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W1789573697
- Cited by
- 691
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 58.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.