The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest because of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt and payout decisions can change drastically depending on managers' preferences. Managers with power utility set investment, debt and payout proportional to the firm's net worth, generating a constant (possibly negative) net debt ratio. With exponential utility, investment decisions are separated from decisions about debt and payout. More profitable firms become cash cows and less profitable firms accumulate debt, as in a pecking order model.
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Cites
Miller, M. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03267.x · Cited by 2,898
Cited by
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Farre-Mensa, J., Michaely, R., & Schmalz, M. (2014) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034259 · Cited by 224
Corporate Governance and Long-Run Risk Premia
Ekponon, A. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3440168
Corporate Governance and Long-Run Risk Premia
Ekponon, A. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5527788
Metadata
- Authors
- Lambrecht, B. M., & Myers, S. C.
- Venue
- The Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-07-19
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 3759-3800
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W3125074392
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 18.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Lambrecht, B. M., & Myers, S. C. (2017). The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt. The Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx081
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