Corporate Governance and Long-Run Risk Premia
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 91 of the 93 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 2 are not checked yet.
Abstract
Understanding the asset-pricing implications of corporate governance has been a challenge for at least the last two decades. As evidenced by the literature, the balance of power between insiders and outside investors should play a significant role in shedding light on this challenge (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; LaPorta et al., 2000a, 2002; Morellec (2004); Lambrecht and Myers, 2008). Corporate finance models with agency costs operate in a riskless environment and so do not make predictions on the risk premium, whereas the ones that do make predictions do so empirically without a model. This paper provides a theoretical solution to this issue by introducing business-cycle risk and Epstein-Zin investors into corporate finance models with agency conflicts. Unlike the literature, we use the term governance risk, measured by the (lagged) instruments of governance indices instead of agency costs, proxied by the actual governance indices in the literature. On the empirical side, this paper eliminates the endogeneity problems embedded into governance indices through the use of the instruments of these indices instead. We also show that firms that have higher governance risk in bad vs. good economy periods for the economy have higher equity premiums. We built a dynamic consumption-based corporate finance model with both business cycles and governance risk, in which state-dependent optimal financing, default, and refinancing decisions are endogenously determined. We focus on the total risk premium, although the business cycle risk drives most of the equity risk premium, as shown in Dorion, Ekponon and Jeanneret (2020). Similar to corporate finance models with agency conflicts, we find that higher governance risk leads insiders to use debt more conservatively. By plugging in an asset pricing framework to these aforementioned models, we show that less debt subsequently produces low equity premium, thus providing a theoretical explanation to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and others’ findings. We also contribute to creating more links between agency conflicts and equity prices. Because governance risk is time-varying, in bad times, firms with greater governance risk see their equity valuation fluctuate more over the business cycle.
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Cites
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Research works printed but not linked: 2
- W Baumol, 1959, Business Behavior
- C Dorion, 2026, What drives expected stock returns? Long-run risk and endogenous leverage
Metadata
- Authors
- Ekponon, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Ottawa (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Ekponon, Adelphe
- ORCID
- Ekponon, Adelphe
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2992781555
- Semantic Scholar
- 86c9edd78a4d151a049533fefbf73fa1d8d16d73
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 83
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- corporate governance, risk premium, agency costs, ESG ratings, CEO turnover, business cycles, stock returns, leverage, business growth, governance quality, endogeneity
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- Ekponon, A. (2019). Corporate Governance and Long-Run Risk Premia. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440168
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