The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Governance Under Common Ownership
Open accessAbstract
Conventional wisdom is that diversification weakens governance by spreading investors too thinly. We show that, when investors own multiple firms (“common ownership”), governance through both voice and exit can strengthen—even if the firms are in unrelated industries. Under common ownership, informed investors have flexibility over which assets to sell upon a liquidity shock. They sell low-quality firms first, thereby increasing price informativeness. In a voice model, investors’ incentives to monitor are stronger since “cutting and running” is less profitable. In an exit model, managers’ incentives to work are stronger since the price impact of investor selling is greater. Received December 5, 2017; editorial decision August 15, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476 · cited 3×
“Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) thus study the hypothetical sales that mutual funds would have made if they scaled back their existing portfolio in proportion, rather than their actual sales. A second prediction concerns the price decline upon a sale of debt or equity. Comparing Lemmas 1 and 2 shows that a price d…”
InfluentialLarge Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
Stein, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261524 · Cited by 1,673
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12698 · Cited by 980 · cited 1×
“More broadly, Huang, Ringgenberg, and Zhang (2018) show that mutual funds sell their worst assets first upon a liquidity shock, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that conglomerates tend to sell their least efficient plants, and Berndt and Gupta (2009) find that borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market…”
Cited by
Internalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership
He, J. (., Huang, J., & Zhao, S. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019 · Cited by 413
Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct
Schmalz, M. C. (2018) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110217-022747 · Cited by 257
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Anton, M., Ederer, F., Gine, M., & Schmalz, M. C. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2802332 · Cited by 150
Metadata
- Authors
- Edmans, A., Levit, D., & Reilly, D.
- Venue
- The Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2018-09-22
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 2673-2719
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W3124103672
- Cited by
- 250
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 30.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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