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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Governance Under Common Ownership

Open access
Edmans, Alex, Levit, Doron, Reilly, Devin · 2019 · The Review of Financial Studies

Abstract

Conventional wisdom is that diversification weakens governance by spreading investors too thinly. We show that, when investors own multiple firms (“common ownership”), governance through both voice and exit can strengthen—even if the firms are in unrelated industries. Under common ownership, informed investors have flexibility over which assets to sell upon a liquidity shock. They sell low-quality firms first, thereby increasing price informativeness. In a voice model, investors’ incentives to monitor are stronger since “cutting and running” is less profitable. In an exit model, managers’ incentives to work are stronger since the price impact of investor selling is greater. Received December 5, 2017; editorial decision August 15, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

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Citations

Cites

  • Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring

    Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476 · cited 3×

    “Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) thus study the hypothetical sales that mutual funds would have made if they scaled back their existing portfolio in proportion, rather than their actual sales. A second prediction concerns the price decline upon a sale of debt or equity. Comparing Lemmas 1 and 2 shows that a price d…”
    Influential
  • Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

    Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408

  • Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia

    Stein, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261524 · Cited by 1,673

  • Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership

    AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12698 · Cited by 980 · cited 1×

    “More broadly, Huang, Ringgenberg, and Zhang (2018) show that mutual funds sell their worst assets first upon a liquidity shock, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that conglomerates tend to sell their least efficient plants, and Berndt and Gupta (2009) find that borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market…”

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Metadata

Authors
Edmans, A., Levit, D., & Reilly, D.
Venue
The Review of Financial Studies
Published
2018-09-22
Volume
32
Issue
7
Pages
2673-2719
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
OpenAlex
W3124103672
Cited by
250
References
4
FWCI
30.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Governance Under Common Ownership. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/hhy108
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Edmans, A., Levit, D., & Reilly, D. (2019). Governance Under Common Ownership. The Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy108

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.