The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Inequality, public opinion and redistribution
Abstract
According to the "median-voter" hypothesis, greater inequality in the market distribution of earnings or income tends to produce greater generosity in redistributive policy.We outline the steps in the causal chain specified by the hypothesis and attempt to assess these steps empirically.Prior studies focusing on cross-country variation have found little support for the median-voter model.We examine over-time trends in eight nations during the 1980s and 1990s.Here too the median-voter hypothesis appears to have little utility.Income inequality has two components: (1) "market" inequality and (2) government redistribution via taxes and transfers.In principle, the two can be combined in any of a variety of ways: low market inequality with high redistribution, low market inequality with low redistribution, high market inequality with moderate redistribution, and so on.Of particular interest in the study of inequality is what happens when market inequality is high or increases.Does government compensate with high redistribution in order to secure a relatively egalitarian distribution of posttax-posttransfer income?According to one influential theoretical approach, that is indeed what tends to happen.This approach is based on a median-voter model of the politics of redistribution.Its best-known exposition is by Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard (1981).A higher level of market inequality implies a greater distance between
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Citations
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How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments
Kuziemko, I., Norton, M. I., Saez, E., & Stantcheva, S. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130360 · Cited by 1,067
The paradox of inequality: income inequality and belief in meritocracy go hand in hand
Mijs, J. J. B. (2021) · Socio-Economic Review · doi:10.1093/ser/mwy051 · Cited by 585
Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach
Ansell, B. W., & Samuels, D. J. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511843686 · Cited by 547
Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis
Rehm, P. (2009) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414008330595 · Cited by 518
The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution
LUPU, N., & PONTUSSON, J. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000128 · Cited by 484
“Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and Redistributive Implications *
Kuziemko, I., Buell, R. W., Reich, T., & Norton, M. I. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt035 · Cited by 301
Income Inequality and Demand for Redistribution: A Multilevel Analysis of European Public Opinion
Finseraas, H. (2009) · Scandinavian Political Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2008.00211.x · Cited by 281
Income Inequality and Class Divides in Parental Investments
Schneider, D., Hastings, O. P., & LaBriola, J. (2018) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/0003122418772034 · Cited by 262
Income inequality influences perceptions of legitimate income differences
Trump, K.-S. (2018) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123416000326 · Cited by 236
The Structure of Inequality and Americans' Attitudes toward Redistribution
Luttig, M. (2013) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nft025 · Cited by 99
Metadata
- Authors
- Kenworthy, L., & McCall, L.
- Venue
- Socio-Economic Review
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-12-04
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 35-68
- ISSN
- 1475-1461 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-147X
- OpenAlex
- W2096147057
- Cited by
- 429
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 54.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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