The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
“Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and Redistributive Implications *
Abstract
We present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are “last-place averse.” Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. In modified dictator games, participants randomly placed in second-to-last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them. Using survey data, we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase. Similarly, in the General Social Survey, those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict.
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Cites
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Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
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Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles
Clark, A. E., Frijters, P., & Shields, M. A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.1.95 · Cited by 3,159
An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods
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Neural evidence for inequality-averse social preferences
Tricomi, E., Rangel, A., Camerer, C. F., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature08785 · Cited by 462
Kling, J. R., Ludwig, J., & Katz, L. F. (2005) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2005.120.1.87 · Cited by 311
Cited by
Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., Almenberg, J., Altmejd, A., Chan, T., et al. (2016) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaf0918 · Cited by 1,314
The Two Facets of Social Policy Preferences
Cavaillé, C., & Trump, K.-S. (2015) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/678312 · Cited by 241
At your service on the table: Impact of tabletop technology on restaurant performance
Tan, T. F., & Netessine, S. (2020) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3430 · Cited by 111
Peer effects and risk sharing in experimental asset markets
Gortner, P. J., & van der Weele, J. J. (2019) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.001 · Cited by 19
Social Class and Scarcity: Understanding Consumers Who Have Less
Shah, A. K. (2015) · The Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Psychology · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706552.025 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Kuziemko, I., Buell, R. W., Reich, T., & Norton, M. I.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-01-10
- Volume
- 129
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 105-149
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2111994306
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 36.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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