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Of P-Values and Bayes: A Modest Proposal

Goodman, Steven N. · 2001 · Epidemiology

Abstract

I am delighted to be invited to comment on the use of P-values, but at the same time, it depresses me. Why? So much brainpower, ink, and passion have been expended on this subject for so long, yet plus ca change, plus c’ést le meme chose– the more things change, the more they stay the same. The references on this topic encompass innumerable disciplines, going back almost to the moment that P-values were introduced (by R.A. Fisher in the 1920s). The introduction of hypothesis testing in 1933 precipitated more intense engagement, caused by the subsuming of Fisher’s “significance test” into the hypothesis test machinery. 1–9 The discussion has continued ever since. I have been foolish enough to think I could whistle into this hurricane and be heard. 10–12 But we (and I) still use P-values. And when a journal like Epidemiology takes a principled stand against them, 13 epidemiologists who may recognize the limitations of P-values still feel as if they are being forced to walk on one leg. 14 So why do those of us who criticize the use of P-values bother to continue doing so? Isn’t the “real world” telling us something – that we are wrong, that the effort is quixotic, or that this is too trivial an issue for epidemiologists to spend time on? Admittedly, this is not the most pressing methodologic issue facing epidemiologists. Still, I will try to argue that the topic is worthy of serious consideration. Let me begin with an observation. When epidemiologists informally communicate their results (in talks, meeting presentations, or policy discussions), the balance between biology, methodology, data, and context is often appropriate. There is an emphasis on presenting a coherent epidemiologic or pathophysiologic “story,” with comparatively little talk of statistical “rejection” or other related tomfoolery. But this same sensibility is often not reflected in published papers. Here, the structure of presentation is more rigid, and statistical summaries seem to have more power. Within these confines, the narrative flow becomes secondary to the distillation of complex data, and inferences seem to flow from the data almost automatically. It is this automaticity of inference that is most distressing, and for which the elimination of P-values has been attempted as a curative. Although I applaud the motivation of attempts to eliminate P-values, they have failed in the past and I predict that they will continue to fail. This is because they treat the symptoms and not the underlying mindset, which must be our target. We must change how we think about science itself. I and others have discussed the connections between statistics and scientific philosophy elsewhere, 11,12,15–22 so I will cut to the chase here. The root cause of our problem is a philosophy of scientific inference that is supported by the statistical methodology in dominant use. This philosophy might best be described as a form of “naïve inductivism,”23 a belief that all scientists seeing the same data should come to the same conclusions. By implication, anyone who draws a different conclusion must be doing so for nonscientific reasons. It takes as given the statistical models we impose on data, and treats the estimated parameters of such models as direct mirrors of reality rather than as highly filtered and potentially distorted views. It is a belief that scientific reasoning requires little more than statistical model fitting, or in our case, reporting odds ratios, P-values and the like, to arrive at the truth. How is this philosophy manifest in research reports? One merely has to look at their organization. Traditionally, the findings of a paper are stated at the beginning of the discussion section. It is as if the finding is something derived directly from the results section. Reasoning and external facts come afterward, if at all. That is, in essence, naïve inductivism. This view of the scientific enterprise is aided and abetted by the P-value in a variety of ways, some obvious, some subtle. The obvious way is in its role in the reject/accept hypothesis test machinery. The more subtle way is in the fact that the P-value is a probability – something absolute, with nothing external needed for its interpretation. Now let us imagine another world – a world in which we use an inferential index that does not tell us where we stand, but how much distance we have covered. Imagine a number that does not tell us what we know, but how much we have learned. Such a number could lead us to think very differently about the role of data in making inferences, and in turn lead us to write about our data in a profoundly different manner. This is not an imaginary world; such a number exists. It is called the Bayes factor. 15,17,25 It is the data component of Bayes Theorem. The odds we put on the null hypothesis (relative to others) using data external to a study is called the “prior odds,” and the odds after seeing the data is the “posterior odds.” The Bayes factor tells us how fa

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Metadata

Authors
Goodman, S. N.
Venue
Epidemiology
Published
2001-05
Volume
12
Issue
3
Pages
295-297
ISSN
1044-3983 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2079784016
Cited by
164
References
4
FWCI
3.69
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Goodman, S. N. (2001). Of P-Values and Bayes: A Modest Proposal. Epidemiology. https://doi.org/10.1097/00001648-200105000-00006

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