Missing links in phenomenological clinical neuroscience: why we still are not there yet
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
PURPOSE OF REVIEW: The phenomenology or systematic study of the patient's subjective experience in neuropsychiatric disorders is widely recognized as important. The methods used, the type of 'knowledge' obtained and the relationship of these observations to standard methods of clinical neuroscience, however, remain ill-defined and highly controversial. RECENT FINDINGS: Advances in the phenomenology of consciousness, self, body-experience, time-perception and intersubjectivity of neuropsychiatric disorders have been made. This review examines two differing approaches to the phenomenological psychiatry-neuroscience interface: the neo-phenomenological approach claims that some of its key concepts (e.g. the hyperreflexivity/ipseity model, prereflective self-awareness) are able to constrain neuroscience; the existential-phenomenological approach counters that phenomenology's role is not to constrain neuroscience but to provide hypotheses for further experimental study. This review compares these two approaches and assesses the current success of their respective claims. SUMMARY: By integrating work of largely untranslated authors, such as Binswanger, Blankenburg, and von Weizsaecker, neglected or cited out of context in the neo-phenomenological approach, the existential-phenomenological approach provides the 'missing links' between phenomenology and clinical neuroscience in a newly emerging but still fragile balance between disciplines. Optimistic claims about the ability of recently proposed phenomenological concepts (neo-phenomenological approach) to constrain neuroscience are unwarranted.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Common blood flow changes across visual tasks: II. Decreases in cerebral cortex
Shulman, G. L., Fiez, J. A., Corbetta, M., Buckner, R. L., Miezin, F. M., Raichle, M. E., & Petersen, S. E. (1997) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.1997.9.5.648 · Cited by 1,890
Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self
Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007017 · Cited by 1,324
Nieuwenhuis, S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., Blom, J., Band, G. P. H., & Kok, A. (2001) · Psychophysiology · doi:10.1111/1469-8986.3850752 · Cited by 1,170
Self-reference and self-awareness
Shoemaker, S. S. (1968) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024121 · Cited by 642
Re-representing consciousness: dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness
Schooler, J. W. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01949-6 · Cited by 485
Touch feel illusion in schizophrenic patients
Peled, A., Ritsner, M., Hirschmann, S., Geva, A. B., & Modai, I. (2000) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s0006-3223(00)00947-1 · Cited by 173
Being a self: considerations from functional imaging
Gusnard, D. A. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.004 · Cited by 116
Cited by
Autobiographical memory and sense of self.
Prebble, S. C., Addis, D. R., & Tippett, L. J. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0030146 · Cited by 466
“For example, the term me-self is sometimes used synonymously with the term reflective consciousness, implying that any reflective awareness of the self is part of the me-self (e.g., Esslen, Metzler, PascualMarqui, & Jancke, 2008; Mishara, 2007).”
BackgroundTemporality and psychopathology
Fuchs, T. (2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9189-4 · Cited by 330
Sterzer, P., Mishara, A. L., Voss, M., & Heinz, A. (2016) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2016.00502 · Cited by 76
Self-citationThe dreaming brain/mind, consciousness and psychosis
Limosani, I., D’Agostino, A., Manzone, M. L., & Scarone, S. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.11.014 · Cited by 28
Phenomenology is Bayesian in its application to delusions
Mishara, A. L., & Sterzer, P. (2015) · World Psychiatry · doi:10.1002/wps.20213 · Cited by 13
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Mishara, A. L.
- Venue
- Current Opinion in Psychiatry
- Published
- 2007-11
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 559-569
- ISSN
- 0951-7367 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2039529683
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 32.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Missing links in phenomenological clinical neuroscience: why we still are not there yet. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1097/yco.0b013e3282f128b8
- The paper
- Mishara, A. L. (2007). Missing links in phenomenological clinical neuroscience: why we still are not there yet. Current Opinion in Psychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1097/yco.0b013e3282f128b8
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.